Jeremy Corbyn’s election to the leadership of the Labour Party sent shock waves throughout British politics. Corbyn, a lifelong socialist, was a rank outsider who had difficulty even getting on the ballot. Yet he ended up trouncing his opponents, winning 60% of the vote. The establishment was aghast. The official opposition to the government now had as its leader a man who, according to the *Daily Telegraph*, planned ‘to turn Britain into Zimbabwe.’

How this remarkable twist of events came about is the topic of Alex Nunns’ highly readable and richly informed book. Drawing on first-hand interviews with those involved in the campaign, including its most senior figures, Nunns traces the origins of Corbyn’s victory in the dissatisfaction with Blairism stirred by the Iraq War and the 2008 financial crash, the move to the left of the trade unions, and changes in the electoral rules of the Labour Party that turned out to be surreally at odds with the intentions of those who introduced them.

Giving full justice to the dramatic swings and nail-biting tensions of an extraordinary summer in UK politics, Nunns tells a story that, until now, has received widespread attention but little understanding.
REFERENCES

This document can be downloaded to your device for offline viewing.

Prologue

Jonathan Freedland, ‘The real gamble for Theresa May would have been to wait until 2020,’ Guardian, 18 April 2017, https://archive.is/Ds7uR.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Led by Ed

1. Patrick Wintour, ‘Ed Miliband leadership: the unions had the last word,’ Guardian, 16 September 2010, https://archive.is/jKOAR.

3. A danger of such an accommodation is that the party is captured by the forces it has made a deal with. In fact, Tony Blair was a willing hostage, as he told the Labour Party conference in 2001: “Just after the election, an old colleague of mine said, ‘Come on Tony, now we’ve won again can’t we drop all this New Labour and do what we believe in?’ I said, ‘It’s worse than you think. I really do believe in it.’” ‘Blair: Key quotes,’ BBC News, 2 October 2001, https://archive.is/RO2sl.


14. Among voters in the affiliated members section (mostly comprising trade unionists), Ed won with 58.8 per cent to David’s 40.2 in the final round. Although David was stronger among party members, it is worth noting that 55,905 of them voted for him in the first round, less than half the 121,751 votes Jeremy Corbyn received from full members in 2015, albeit in a greatly enlarged party.

15. The vast majority of the fall in membership occurred under Tony Blair; the total was down to 177,000 by the time Gordon Brown took over in 2007. Hugh Pemberton and Mark Wickham-Jones (University of Bristol), ‘Labour’s lost grassroots: the rise and fall of party membership,’ British Politics (journal), Volume 8, Issue 2, pp. 181-206, Table 1: Labour Party membership 1989-2011, https://research-information.bristol.ac.uk/files/8434495/Labour_s_Lost_Grassroots_BP_FINAL.pdf.


21. This was broadly the same as 2010, but comparison is difficult because the left slate had been split two years earlier. See Jon Lansman, ‘Labour executive elections: Left 47%, Right 33%, Ind 20%,’ Left Futures, 20 June 2012, https://archive.is/aN2fC.


25. A core function of Progress was, according to a damning article penned by Michael Meacher MP in March 2012, to “recruit and train potential parliamentary candidates that fit its own ideological mould to the exclusion of the broad spectrum that had always previously characterised the Labour Party.”
Labelled a Blairite “party within a party,” Progress was lavishly funded by Lord Sainsbury—who bankrolled the SDP in the 1980s—with full-time staff and extensive links throughout the right of the Parliamentary Labour Party and beyond. Michael Meacher, ‘Progress has become a party within a party,’ New Statesman, 15 March 2012, https://archive.is/Tx47d.

26. For an instance when postal ballot boxes were tampered with in a selection in 2009 see Michael Meacher, ‘Erith and Thamesmead: the smell of decay,’ Michael Meacher’s website, 19 April 2009, https://archive.is/j6iea.


29. Selection contest rules had not changed much, although there had been some minor alterations, such as allowing potential candidates more time to campaign for the support of local parties. See Tim Bale, Five Year Mission: The Labour Party Under Ed Miliband (Oxford University Press, 2015), ch. 7, p. 173 (ebook version, MOBI/Kindle).


32. There was history behind this. A decade and a half earlier the CLP had been shattered by—what else?—a selection row. Until 2000, the area was represented by the left wing Labour MP Dennis Canavan. When, in the late 1990s, Canavan decided to stand for the newly created Scottish Parliament, the New Labour machine—then at the peak of its power and paranoia—excluded him from the list of candidates. Canavan protested that party bosses were saying that “neither the sitting MP nor anyone else from our area is good enough to represent the constituency in the Scottish Parliament,” adding that it was “an insult to the people of Falkirk.” The people seemed to agree, rewarding Canavan’s decision to stand as an independent against the imposed candidate by sending him to Holyrood with over 50 per cent of the vote, leaving Labour 12,000 votes behind. Canavan had made his election “a protest against Labour Party centralisation and authoritarianism,” in the words of Lewis Minkin, the keenest academic chronicler of Tony Blair’s party management. But his actions earned him expulsion from Labour. A big chunk of local members and officials went with him. New Labour’s manipulation had backfired in every way possible.


33. Joyce had himself originally been ‘parachuted in’ to the seat. Mark Seddon, ‘The chutzpah of Peter Mandelson—and why we need more trade unionists,’ LabourList, 22 May 2013, https://archive.is/kTEOq.


   Peter Watt, ‘Why has Ed allowed the unions to stitch up the euro candidate selections? What happened to the new politics?’ Labour Uncut, 11 April 2013, https://archive.is/hoL9J.

   Mark Seddon, ‘The chutzpah of Peter Mandelson—and why we need more trade unionists,’ LabourList, 22 May 2013, https://archive.is/kTEOq.

38. Len McCluskey says: “My one regret about Falkirk is I would never have used ‘union join’… I personally disagree with the idea that the union can pay for membership. I’m one of these people that thinks you have to get money from people, that way they feel connected and committed.”

The party knew from the beginning that Gregor Poynton had paid for the memberships—it was mentioned in passing in Appendix 1 of the secret report. But it was not followed up or referenced in the body of the report, raising an apparent double standard. Poynton was the political director of a firm with an important contract with the Labour Party, and the husband of MP Gemma Doyle. ‘Labour Party’s Falkirk


55. ‘Karie Murphy “excluded” from Halifax candidacy,’ BBC News, 17 March 2015, https://archive.is/gE6VD.


58. Declan McHugh, ‘Why did Labour use this system to elect its leader?’ New Statesman, 8 September 2015, https://archive.is/Bi8At.
59. Ibid.
60. With Labour having ceded the argument on the individualisation of affiliation fees, it was more than unfortunate that the Conservatives then won a majority at the 2015 election and immediately exploited the principle for their own Trade Union Bill, designed to hobble and impoverish Labour while ignoring the wider issue of party funding. Although pressure in the House of Lords and the government’s desire to get the trade unions onside for the EU referendum campaign meant some of the more egregious aspects of the Bill were withdrawn, Labour had still contrived to make a rod for its own back.
63. Unison’s unique arrangement was the product of a previous merger between a non-affiliated union and two smaller affiliated unions. See Jon Rogers, ‘Ed Miliband praises Unison’s Labour fund “opt-in”… but it’s not that simple,’ Red Pepper, 10 July 2013, https://archive.is/QAIPX.
64. An extremely complex arrangement was devised which actually saw collective affiliations retained (because without them the Labour Party would have gone bust immediately), but initiated a five-year transition period
during which union members would be invited to ‘opt in.’ At the end of the five years, collective affiliation fees would reflect individual affiliations.

65. John McTernan, Twitter, 1 February 2014, https://archive.is/1Y9yT.

66. The affiliated members section also included members of socialist societies and affiliated groups, such as the Socialist Health Association and the Fabian Society.

67. These figures are based on the numbers who actually voted. The disparities are even greater when considering those eligible to vote. The New Statesman calculated in 2010 that the vote of one MP was worth that of 608 eligible party members and 12,915 eligible affiliated members. But this is not a particularly useful measure, as it would never be the case that all 3.5 million affiliated trade unionists, many of whom support other parties, would vote. George Eaton, ‘How much is your Labour leadership vote worth?’ New Statesman, 26 August 2010, https://archive.is/7fNi2.

68. Declan McHugh, ‘Why did Labour use this system to elect its leader?’ New Statesman, 8 September 2015, https://archive.is/Bi8At.

69. There is a longer backstory to the unions’ change of mind on one-member-one-vote. In 2004, by better coordinating their efforts and speaking with one voice through TULO, they triumphed in securing the Warwick Agreement, a wide-ranging deal on policy that shaped Labour’s 2005 election manifesto. The party machine was not about to take this lying down, and in 2006 it reacted by stitching up the National Policy Forum by packing it with leadership loyalists to prevent further union victories. It was to break this stranglehold that the unions teamed up with the Campaign for Labour
Party Democracy to pass the 2009 rule change. That made constituency delegates—who had 30 per cent of the vote on the National Policy Forum—directly accountable to party members. It was controversial—unions were told it was not for them to support one-member-one-vote for another part of the party. But they stuck to their guns despite the opposition of then-leader Gordon Brown. The unions now knew that they could back one-member-one-vote and that it could work to their advantage.


73. The three were Liz Kendall, Mary Creagh, and Tristram Hunt. See chapter 5.

74. The Blairites appear to have simply assumed that registered supporters would be just like themselves. The following account of “a little noticed experiment conducted by John Mann in his Bassetlaw constituency” during the 2010 leadership contest might explain why: “Mann, convinced that there was a need to ‘widen democracy’ and open up the leadership election to the public, identified Labour supporters in his constituency and conducted a ‘primary’ to determine who he should vote for... At a cost of several thousand pounds he worked with the Bassetlaw CLP and other volunteers to
conduct a postal ballot of over 10,000 people who were said to be Labour supporters. Writing for Progress magazine in July 2010, Andy Burnham—who was, of course, standing as a leadership candidate—praised John Mann’s primary. In his article he stated that membership fees were a barrier to participation, that he wanted to create an affiliate membership (i.e. ‘registered supporters’), and that as leader of the Labour Party he would look to include registered supporters in future internal elections and selections. (To Burnham’s dismay Labour supporters in Bassetlaw voted for David Miliband in the primary and John Mann cast his ballot accordingly.)” There was, though, a significant difference between Mann’s experiment and the registered supporter system that Labour eventually adopted: a £3 fee. See ‘Hoist by its own petard,’ Labour Party Marxists, 3 September 2015, https://archive.is/6iYu0.

75. This time registered supporters would be diluting the voting power of party members too.

76. Jon Trickett was a left voice who was not shut out, but he was working on behalf of Ed Miliband.


Chapter 3: The Jaws of Defeat

1. Alastair Campbell, ‘Nice guy, good MP, making the weather: but it has to be ABC—Anyone But Corbyn. Labour could be finished if he wins,’ AlastairCampbell.org, 10 August 2015, https://archive.is/z4HV0.


4. After the 2010 election there were 204 constituencies where the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats occupied first and second place (either way around). In 2015, the Conservative share of the vote in those seats stayed about the same but the Liberal Democrat share halved. The Tories won virtually all of them. Ron Johnston, Charles Pattie and David Manley, ‘The case of the missing marginals: Labour’s task in 2020 is harder than they currently realise,’ London School of Economics British Politics and Policy blog, 1 June 2015, https://archive.is/MEJir.

4. In 21 of the 27 seats, the Conservatives took the constituency with fewer votes than the Liberal Democrats secured in 2010, although there was also
some “vote churn”—the Conservatives were able to replace votes they lost to UKIP with former Liberal Democrat supporters.


6. Labour gained 12 seats from the Liberal Democrats. On average, in the 95 constituencies where Labour and the Liberal Democrats occupied first and second place after the 2010 election, Labour increased its vote share by 6 per cent in 2015, and the Liberal Democrat vote fell by two-thirds. It is interesting that in seats that featured a Conservative-Liberal Democrat battle with Labour out of contention, Labour did not increase its vote share despite the Liberal Democrat collapse, and the same applies to the Conservative vote share in seats where Labour fought the Liberal Democrats.


In a pamphlet for the Fabian Society, Andrew Harrop asserted that four out of five voters that Labour would need to win to secure a majority at the subsequent election would be people who voted Conservative in 2015. This claim was used to argue that Labour should
move right to attract Conservative voters. But it was based on several false assumptions, such as a uniform swing and no increase in turnout. A detailed look at individual constituencies showed that the picture at the local level was complex and variegated. Andrew Harrop, ‘The mountain to climb: Labour’s 2020 challenge,’ The Fabian Society, May 2015, pp. 6-7, https://archive.is/Tajg4.


Labour MP Dan Jarvis claimed that “the Tories were much more effective in squeezing the UKIP vote in these marginals. Labour typically did 4 per cent worse in the areas where support for UKIP increased the most, compared to a 2 per cent fall in support for the Tories.” Dan Jarvis, ‘Reconnecting Labour: Initial findings,’ self-published report, 21 August 2015, https://archive.is/BzfTt.

10. Labour MP Jon Cruddas estimated that UKIP cost Labour 13 seats. But the Labour Party’s official election inquiry conducted by Margaret Beckett came to a different conclusion: “The analysis by the party’s staff and that by British Electoral Survey [sic]... suggests UKIP may have had no impact on the seats result... It is not possible to identify any seat where the increase in the UKIP vote clearly came more from Labour 2010 voters than from the Conservatives, which means, by definition, that there is no seat which Labour might
have won in the absence of UKIP, but did not because of Labour switching.”


11. Luke Pollard, a Labour prospective parliamentary candidate for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport in 2015 (who went on to win the seat in 2017), said: “UKIP’s populist positioning meant they ate into our vote on both the right on immigration, and the left on issues like the economy.”


13. Margaret Beckett, in her official inquiry for the Labour Party, asserted “with some confidence” that the rise of the Greens “played little part in Labour’s defeat,” although she did not provide the detail on which that judgement was based.


18. Ibid.
   Taken to its logical conclusion, the ultimate aspirational citizens were the London rioters who raided shops for TVs and trainers in 2011—they were real go-getters.
22. For criticism of the use of social grades as a proxy for class see Richard Seymour, ‘Your incorrect theory of class,’ Patreon, 12 July 2017, https://archive.is/Uk6OI.
   Unfortunately there is no easily available alternative, especially when comparing with elections of the past.
23. The full House of Commons Library figures used by Jon Trickett were as follows:

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<td>C2</td>
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<td>DE</td>
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Ipsos MORI’s estimate of the class breakdown of Labour’s 2015 support differed somewhat from that of the House of Commons Library, but other polls accorded closely. Ipsos MORI put Labour one point lower among both AB and C1 voters and notably higher among C2 and DE voters, at 32 and 41 per cent. This did not contradict the claim of a massive loss of working class support since 2005, but suggested Labour recovered by 3 points among C2 voters and by 1 point among DE voters under Ed Miliband. Ipsos MORI emphasised that its figures were estimates based on polls over the course of the election campaign, adjusted to the final result (with an aggregated sample of 9,000). Two other polls corroborated the House of Commons Library figures, one by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research for the Trade Union Congress (sample size 4,669), and a huge 100,000-person survey by YouGov. Jon Trickett, ‘It was the working class, not the middle class that sunk Labour,’ New Statesman, 13 May 2015, https://archive.is/lnUSa. ‘How Britain voted in 2015,’ Ipsos MORI, 26 August 2015, https://archive.is/UBhFl.
‘UK post election poll for the TUC,’ (an interactive website—select “Voting Intention” and Subgroup: Social grade AB, C1, C2 and DE to see the relevant graphs), Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, publication date around 21 May 2015, https://archive.is/9HVU0.


For fuller data see ‘UK post election poll for the TUC,’ (an interactive website—select “Reasons and Doubts,” Question: “Doubts about Labour,” Subgroup: “Total” and “Considered Lab, voted Con” to see the relevant graphs), Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, publication date around 21 May 2015, https://archive.is/9HVUO.

25. There was another attempt to stand up the aspiration argument. This came later, in August 2015, and so was not part of the early Blairite offensive. As part of his Independent Inquiry (always capitalised) into the election defeat, Jon Cruddas MP (who is not a Blairite) claimed that “Labour was sunk by a tsunami of aspirant voters.” Wisely, he did not define these people as middle class or speculate on which supermarket they preferred. He deliberately avoided class altogether, saying he did not want to “fix voters into simplistic unchanging categories based on income, demographics or other visible attributes”—which left little to go on, except for the nebulous notion of people’s “values.”
Handily, this revealed that one of the three “values groups” into which the entire population could be divided was made up of materialists who “vote pragmatically for whichever party they think will improve their financial circumstances.” These people were called Prospectors and were characterised as “aspirational.” (The other two groups, also named after American cultural archetypes, were Pioneers—liberal, altruistic idealists who made up much of the Labour vote—and Settlers—socially conservative, security-craving traditionalists who had increasingly backed UKIP.) Cruddas found that Prospectors had “dealt Labour its devastating electoral defeat,” as Tory support among the group had soared by 19 per cent between November 2014 and the election. Because Prospectors were apparently aspirational, and Labour had lost ground among them, Cruddas simply stated that Labour’s defeat was down to aspirational voters. But he provided no evidence that an absence of aspirational policies or messaging from Labour was what had lost these people’s votes. On the contrary, he said they had shunned Labour because it “lacked economic credibility and gave the perception that it would be profligate in government,” leaving Prospectors “concerned about their financial prospects”—a defensive motivation. It was also a view hardly unique to the aspirational, being the top doubt about Labour given by all voters of every demographic category in other post-election polls. The violent surge in support for the Tories over a short space of time among Prospectors (and, Cruddas found, Settlers and Pioneers too) did not seem to raise any questions about the robustness of values-based polling,
but it should have, given that it was impossible to reconcile with the nearly flat trend of other polls over the same period. Cruddas did not invent the method—his findings were actually an update of a 2013 report published by Blairite think-tank the Institute for Public Policy Research, which evangelised about applying “Values Modes analysis” to British politics. But in that report, historical data was cited which should have set alarm bells ringing. In 2012, 30 per cent of people were classed as Settlers, based on their questionnaire responses. But just one year earlier that proportion had been 39 per cent. Could 9 per cent of the country—representing around 6 million people—really have abandoned their core values between 2011 and 2012? Similarly, the proportion that held Prospector values decreased by 10 per cent between 2005 and 2008. Apparently people’s fundamental values were in a state of wild flux, year by year. This hardly seemed a reliable basis on which to craft a political strategy, or pronounce the cause of an election defeat.

At best, values-based polling could provide an extra perspective alongside traditional, demographic surveys. But Cruddas used it as the sole basis for his slam-dunk claim about the “tsunami of aspirant voters.” It was an attempt to take the Blairite theme of aspiration, strip it of its middle class finery, clothe it in the language of values and push it back onto the political stage before the curtain fell. It did not convince.


Nick Pecorelli, ‘The New Electorate: Why understanding values is the key to electoral success,’ Institute for

It was possible to come to very different conclusions from Cruddas using Values Modes. The co-founder of the method, Pat Dade, used it to make a pro-Corbyn case. Pat Dade, ‘New, Blue or True Labour?’ Cultural Dynamics website, August 2015, https://archive.is/TQvVU.

For conventional polling on the issue of the economy see ‘UK post election poll for the TUC,’ (an interactive website—select “Reasons and Doubts,” Question: “Doubts about Labour”), Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, publication date around 21 May 2015, https://archive.is/9HVU0.


28. Of those who did rank it highly, they cared because—by a margin of 28-percentage points—they thought Labour would be too soft on big business. ‘UK post election poll for the TUC,’ (an interactive website—select “Important Issues,” Subgroup: “Total” to see the relevant graphs), Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, publication date around 21 May 2015, https://archive.is/9HVU0.
29. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is very left wing, 10 is very right wing, and 5 is the centre, voters placed Labour at 3 in 2015. The Conservatives were perceived as being at 8—nearly as far right as UKIP, and to the right of their own voters.


33. “Those who voted Labour in 2010 but subsequently switched their support to the SNP after the referendum were both disproportionately in favour of a more equal society and more likely to regard the SNP as the party that shared that view,” Curtice found. “No less than 74 per cent of these lost voters supported the redistribution of income (compared with 59 per cent of Scots generally), and although 48 per cent of them thought that Labour backed that position, 75 per cent reckoned that the SNP did.” John Curtice, ‘A defeat to reckon with: On Scotland, economic competence, and the complexities of Labour’s loses,’ Institute for Public Policy Research, 17 June 2015, https://archive.is/9DkBq.

34. Labour gained 15 seats in England but lost 40 in Scotland and another one in Wales.

35. This polling came from Jon Cruddas as part of his Independent Inquiry into the election defeat. Cruddas
used the result to claim that voters were hostile to “the SNP’s anti-austerity politics,” while providing no evidence to show that it was this, rather than the party’s more widely known aim of Scottish independence, that worried English and Welsh people. Jon Cruddas, ‘Labour lost because voters believed it was anti-austerity,’ LabourList, 5 August 2015, https://archive.is/SNbhc.

36. From March 2015 David Cameron tried to frighten the public about the prospect of “an alliance between the people who want to bankrupt Britain and the people who want to break up Britain.” The Conservative Party diverted huge resources into scare campaigns targeted on marginal seats. Billboard posters depicted Ed Miliband popping his head out from the suit pocket of a giant-sized Alex Salmond, the former SNP leader. Frances Perraudin and Rowena Mason, ‘Tory election campaign poster depicts Ed Miliband in pocket of SNP,’ Guardian, 9 March 2015, https://archive.is/nPPtQ.

37. “We currently find little robust evidence that attitudes towards the SNP and expectations about a hung parliament resulted in gains for the Conservatives from UKIP or in vote losses for Labour from former Lib Dems,” Green and Prosser wrote. On the contrary, the prospect of a hung parliament seemed to have strengthened the vote of smaller parties. “We find much clearer and more robust evidence that perceptions that there was going to be a hung parliament enhanced votes for ‘challenger parties’ overall: UKIP, Plaid Cymru, the Greens, the Lib Dems and the SNP. This might have cost Labour votes, but not in the ways people may assume.” Professor Jane Green and Chris Prosser, ‘Learning the right lessons from Labour’s 2015 defeat,’
British Election Study, 17 September 2015, https://archive.is/7jgET.

38. ‘Post-vote day poll,’ Lord Ashcroft Polls, 8 May 2015, https://archive.is/Mfl70.


41. Ibid.

42. Of course this was not true for everyone. Older voters considered the deficit a more important issue and thought that Labour should cut it faster (albeit by a small margin). Naturally, so did Conservative supporters, including those that considered Labour before voting Tory. ‘UK post election poll for the TUC,’ (an interactive website—select “Important Issues,” Subgroup: “Age: 18-34,” “Age: 35-54,” “Age: 55+”; also select “Policy Positions,” Question: “Labour Party position,” Pair: “Rate to cut public spending”), Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, publication date around 21 May 2015, https://archive.is/9HVU0.

John Curtice, ‘A defeat to reckon with: On Scotland, economic competence, and the complexities of Labour’s

43. ‘Post-vote day poll,’ Lord Ashcroft Polls, 8 May 2015, https://archive.is/Mfl7O.

A later Lord Ashcroft poll found that this was also true of people who had voted Labour in 2010 but switched to the Conservatives in 2015—predictably, as there had to have been a reason why they voted Tory. Lord Ashcroft, ‘Project Red Dawn: Labour’s revival (and survival),’ Lord Ashcroft Polls, September 2015, p23, https://archive.is/7e39v.

44. ‘Post-vote day poll,’ Lord Ashcroft Polls, 8 May 2015, https://archive.is/Mfl7O.


47. Emily Thornberry, interview with the author for Le Monde Diplomatique, 12 September 2015.


49. See Figure 1, ‘Which party is best on the economy,’ in Professor Jane Green and Chris Prosser, ‘Learning the right lessons from Labour’s 2015 defeat,’ British Election Study, 17 September 2015, https://archive.is/7jgET.

51. Liam Byrne, “I’m afraid there is no more money.” The letter I will regret forever,’ Guardian, 9 May 2015, https://archive.is/u824Y.


55. Former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis said that Britain had not experienced much technical austerity: George Osborne tried it for a while after 2010, but when it nearly crashed the economy he changed course in 2012. However, the word ‘austerity’ has a political currency in the UK which may not align precisely with the macro-economic definition. ‘Austerity’ is here used to describe the political project to transfer the costs of the banking crisis onto the general population through cuts in public spending.


64. Polls suggested that 12.5 million people would vote Conservative and 11.3 million did. 12.2 million were
predicted to vote Labour but only 9.3 million did. Ben Page, ‘The election, the polls, and aftermath,’ Ipsos MORI, 12 May 2015, slide 11, https://archive.is/5hqob.


66. Miliband came well behind Cameron when people were asked who would make the best prime minister. But it is not certain that Miliband was as big a drag on Labour as was commonly thought. A University of Oxford study concluded that had Cameron and Miliband swapped parties, “this would have yielded relatively little change in vote share.” Immigration was a significant issue, although it was not the most important concern for the vast majority of the population. Tacking to the right did not prevent Labour losing votes over immigration to the Conservatives and UKIP. Some analysts have argued that those for whom immigration was the top priority were lost to Labour anyway, whereas there were votes to be gained elsewhere with a defence of the benefits that immigration brings. Similarly, on welfare, another area where Labour was perceived to be on the back foot, the University of Oxford study suggested there were potential votes in defending social security if the party had chosen to take on the political consensus. On Miliband see ‘Post-vote day poll,’ Lord Ashcroft Polls, 8 May 2015, https://archive.is/Kztvv.

On welfare see ibid., p. 11, pp. 17-18.


Chapter 4: From Despair to Where?

1. Extra-parliamentary struggle refers to the various campaigns and social movements that work for change in society through demonstrations, awareness raising, workplace organising, rather than primarily through parliament. The Left Platform meeting is reconstructed from the following sources: author interview with John McDonnell; Luke James, ‘TUC Will Be “First Test” for New Leader,’ Morning Star, 14 May 2015, https://archive.is/G3rQa; ‘Report and notes from second Labour Left Platform meeting (12 May),’ Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory, 12 May 2015, https://archive.is/MgKTD.


3. The ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ labels are often used pejoratively, and oversimplify what has always been a spectrum of shifting positions. But without an appreciation of the rift it is impossible to explain how the Bennite left came to be so completely marginalised. On the terminology,
‘socialist left’ or ‘Bennite left’ might be fairer terms for the ‘hard left,’ although neither is perfect (not all of the figures commonly dubbed ‘hard left’ are Bennites, and though they are all socialists, many on the ‘soft left’ would describe themselves as such too). There is no obvious alternative for ‘soft left’—very few would now claim to be ‘Kinnockites’ or even know what that represents. While there were sharp distinctions between the two groups in the Benn and Kinnock years, the picture subsequently became blurred as the dominance of the right rendered the fine detail of the left’s policy disagreements less important.

4. The parliamentary left was described as a “sealed tomb,” a collection of MPs from a bygone age, gradually shrinking in number as they lost their seats, retired or died. Alan Simpson, ‘Inside New Labour’s rolling coup: the Blair Supremacy,’ Red Pepper, December 2014, https://archive.is/BCLY8.

5. Meacher believed he could gather the required nominations by resuscitating part of the ‘soft left’—which had been completely subsumed by New Labour—and uniting it with the Campaign Group. But Brown, desperate to inherit the leadership unopposed, quickly cowed most of the ‘soft left’ MPs Meacher was targeting. McDonnell had more backers in the Campaign Group than Meacher, but found it hard to appeal beyond it. In the end, after Meacher stood down in favour of McDonnell, Brown made any challenge mathematically impossible, hoarding nearly all the nominations.

7. The LRC was both a rival and an ally of the CLPD, occupying a similar position within the party but with tactical distinctions. Whereas the CLPD’s approach was to appeal to Labour’s “centre ground,” building broad support around specific proposals on the party’s internal workings, the LRC was politically more pointed.


9. Ibid.


11. John McDonnell’s address to the Labour Representation Committee Special General Meeting, 20 February 2016 (transcribed by the author).


13. The full 10 were: Richard Burgon; Louise Haigh; Harry Harpham, who sadly died in February 2016; Imran Hussain; Clive Lewis; Rebecca Long-Bailey; Rachael Maskell; Kate Osamor; Cat Smith; and Jo Stevens. Seven of these went on to nominate Jeremy Corbyn, while three backed Burnham (Harpham, Maskell and Stevens).

15. Rebecca Barnes, interview with the author. See also Rebecca Barnes, ‘We Need an Anti-Austerity Leader,’ Chartist, 4 June 2015, https://archive.is/2k2iI.
18. John McDonnell’s address to the Labour Representation Committee Special General Meeting, 20 February 2016 (transcribed by the author).
24. Chuka Umunna was originally selected to stand as a candidate in Streatham with the backing of Compass, the ‘soft left’ group, and had previously worked on Jon Cruddas’ 2007 deputy leadership campaign, which advanced a ‘soft left’ platform.


28. The distinction between Brownites and Blairites was generally one of tone rather than substance. At a stretch, Brownites tended to sound and in some cases be more social democratic; Blairites were more overtly enthusiastic about globalisation. But they were two flavours of the same ideology.


30. In July 2015 Rachel Reeves said she thought that the national debt should be halved from 80 per cent of GDP to 40 per cent on a strict timetable, because the party’s plan under Ed Balls would have been far too slow. As the Independent noted, this implied “huge spending cuts.” See Andrew Grice, ‘Budget 2015: Labour to adopt harder line on deficit to distance party from Ed Miliband era,’ Independent, 7 July 2015, https://archive.is/zhfb4.

31. Daniel Boffey and Toby Helm, ‘Andy Burnham: My Campaign is “heart of Labour.” I am not into factional

32. Jason Beattie, ‘Andy Burnham vows to get tough on benefits if he wins Labour leadership race,’ Mirror, 29 May 2015, https://archive.is/YiLgM.
Burnham also came out in support of using US-style primaries to select Labour’s parliamentary candidates—a Blairite demand served neat with no ice. ‘Andy Burnham comes out in favour of open primaries for selecting parliamentary candidates,’ LabourList, 4 June 2015, https://archive.is/tlOtL.


38. “[Burnham’s campaign] didn’t want a repeat of Ed Miliband,” says Cat Smith. “They didn’t want most MPs
backing Liz Kendall or Yvette Cooper, and Andy becoming leader of the Labour Party, and then Cameron attacking Andy for not having the support of the PLP.”

After the Kinnock years, the ‘soft left’ allowed itself to be almost completely subsumed by New Labour. In 2007 it resurfaced in the deputy leadership candidacy of Jon Cruddas. Although he did not win, his impressive showing was enough to prompt headlines such as “Why Labour is lurching left” in the Sun—incontrovertible proof of success. The Cruddas campaign was built on two pillars. The organising muscle came from the big unions, which refused to support either McDonnell or Meacher against Brown for the leadership that year but saw a chance to assert themselves in the deputy contest. The intellectual weight came from the pressure group Compass, a hybrid think tank and membership organisation with a breadth of involvement across the left that suggested it wanted to move beyond the debilitating ‘soft’/’hard’ division, although in practice it was unable to shake the ‘soft left’ tag.

Launched by a host of former New Labour insiders in 2003, Compass illustrated the extent to which the ‘soft left’ had been bound up in that project. “We were all enthusiasts for New Labour,” said Compass’ driving force Neal Lawson, “but our enthusiasm was conditional on tackling the inequalities in the market and creating a new kind of politics.” Cruddas’ political biography epitomised this lineage—he worked in Number 10 during Blair’s first term, representing the trade unions within government (when, he said, “there were still spaces to occupy, like on the minimum wage”) before becoming disillusioned after 2001.
Cruddas and his deputy leadership campaign manager, the Yorkshire MP Jon Trickett, gave Compass a parliamentary presence. (It is a simplification—but a handy one—to see the two MPs as spanning the ‘soft left’ spectrum, with Cruddas to the right and Trickett at its leftward edge.) From the perspective of Compass’ left wing rivals, particularly in the LRC, the problem with this revived parliamentary ‘soft left’ was that it was unreliable. Cruddas and Trickett voted with the Brown government for 42-day detention without charge in 2008, against the wishes of Compass’ members, causing Trickett to resign his position in the organisation. John McDonnell, for one, was so furious at their decision that he declared he would not be associated with them again.

After Labour was thrown out of power in 2010 and Gordon Brown resigned, the unions hoped for another good showing from Cruddas, only this time for the leadership itself. But at the last moment he decided not to stand, causing despair among his backers. Though union weight swung behind Ed Miliband, some of those who had worked on Cruddas’ campaign resolved to make sure they would be in a better position in future. The aim was to get a clutch of union-friendly MPs elected in 2015 with a view to having a credible leadership candidate with five years’ experience under his or her belt by 2020. This was one impetus for the drive by the unions to identify and support working class parliamentary candidates, which brought them into close combat with the Blairite Progress faction. The influence of Compass fell away during Miliband’s tenure. With a Labour leader it could fully support, Compass had looked well placed to become his
powerbase. Instead it backed off from Labour, shifting its focus to appeal beyond the party. This decision, cemented by a 2011 vote to open up the organisation to members of all parties, was a recognition of the growing political pluralism in society and on the left. But it came at the price of lost influence inside Labour. To those whose focus remained firmly within the party it looked like a retreat from the fight.

Miliband’s own politics were ambiguous—he was labelled ‘soft left’ but was associated with the Blue Labour trend, an attempt to intellectualise social conservatism under a curious choice of name that guaranteed it would have little resonance within the party.


Compass Youth Group, ‘42 Days—Letters to Jon Cruddas and Jon Trickett,’ Compass Youth, 11 June 2008, https://archive.is/5CK3s.


Newswire, ‘Compass opens up to other parties,’ Liberal Conspiracy, 25 February 2011, https://archive.is/XuSWZ.

40. George Eaton, ‘The next Labour leader will struggle to persuade that they can do more than fail better,’ New Statesman, 3 June 2015, https://archive.is/A42zw.

41. “I had support from the trade union movement and from the left of the party but that doesn’t make me a


42. ‘LIVE: Jeremy Corbyn holds final campaign rally in Islington North,’ Ruptly TV channel, YouTube, 10 September 2015, [https://youtu.be/KDE8ruratsc](https://youtu.be/KDE8ruratsc).

43. For a taste of this sentiment, see the comments on the Facebook page ‘We want an anti-austerity candidate for Labour Leader—CLPD has called on Jon Trickett to stand, please support this call,’ Facebook, [https://archive.is/rmQKJ](https://archive.is/rmQKJ).

44. These stretched back to 2008 and Trickett’s associations with Jon Cruddas and Compass.


47. On 18 May 2015 McDonnell launched a new website, Radical Labour, to “host a debate on the issues the Labour leadership candidates have to address.” The height of his ambition was to throw unsolicited ideas into a process that had become a “glamour contest between a group of candidates with little ideologically to choose between them.” ‘John McDonnell launches a
campaign to change the shape of the leadership debate,’ LabourList, 18 May 2015, https://archive.is/OJxuA.


49. A few days earlier Trickett had made comments sharply critical of the tone of the leadership debate. ‘Jon Trickett says Labour’s policies didn’t lose them election and criticises leadership candidates,’ LabourList, 20 May 2015, https://archive.is/cKxXs.

50. On 26 May Lansman published an article on Left Futures explaining why Trickett would “fit the bill” and a Facebook page was created to build the pressure. Jon Lansman, ‘Jon Trickett must stand for Leader says Campaign for Labour Party Democracy,’ Left Futures, 26 May 2015, https://archive.is/DTRgr. ‘We want an anti-austerity candidate for Labour Leader—CLPD has called on Jon Trickett to stand, please support this call,’ Facebook, https://archive.is/rmQKJ.


51. “It was a slight surprise that they came to see me because I’d made it clear I wasn’t going to stand,” Trickett said. Rosa Prince, Comrade Corbyn: A Very Unlikely Coup (Biteback Publishing, 2016), ch. 15, p. 277 (ebook version, EPUB/iPad).


53. The meetings appear to have been convened quite informally, and while John McDonnell and Jon Lansman refer to them as Campaign Group meetings fellow
attendees Cat Smith and Clive Lewis thought they were just gatherings of the left.

54. The account of the meeting is based on interviews with the author by Clive Lewis and John McDonnell, although McDonnell does not say that Corbyn volunteered himself to stand.


60. According to Jon Lansman, interview with the author.

61. The purpose of the meeting was to debate which London mayoral candidate the union should endorse.

Chapter 5: Getting on the Ballot

1. Meeting reconstructed based on author interviews with Cat Smith, Jon Lansman and John McDonnell; John McDonnell’s address to the Labour Representation Committee Special General Meeting, 20 February 2016;
John McDonnell’s account given at the final rally of the leadership campaign in Islington, 10 September 2015 (‘LIVE: Jeremy Corbyn holds final campaign rally in Islington North,’ Ruptly TV channel, YouTube, 1 hour 12 minutes, https://youtu.be/KDE8ruratsc?t=1h12m); and Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt, ‘The Corbyn earthquake—how Labour was shaken to its foundations,’ Guardian, 25 September 2015, https://archive.is/EqmPQ.

2. See chapter 2.


4. Jon Lansman wrote on the Left Futures blog that evening that it was “important that party members and trade unionists press their MPs to allow the voters a proper choice by nominating Jeremy.” See Jon Lansman, ‘Jeremy Corbyn to stand as anti-austerity leadership candidate,’ Left Futures, 3 June 2015, https://archive.is/JrMF5.


On Twitter, a hashtag makes a term easily searchable, so users can monitor all the tweets being posted that include that tag. It is a way of grouping together contributions by topic. When a large number of people are tweeting at once using the same hashtag it is said to be “trending.” #JezWeCan became an extremely active hashtag.

10. The Corbyn4Leader account went on to make great use of the quip throughout the summer, almost to the exclusion of the official “Straight talking, honest politics” motto, which Sellers was not so keen on and which was too long for a Twitter hashtag in any case.


15. Ibid.
Even the curation of the lists of MPs became, in the words of activist James Doran, who was involved in the effort, “a very distributed process” with people adding or crossing off names based on MPs’ replies and statements.

16. The argument of the petition was interesting. It asked MPs to effectively override ill-conceived rules: “The requirement to have 35 MPs nominating candidates in
order to enable them to appear on the ballot assumes that the MPs fully reflect the make-up of the party. In the absence of any other way of getting onto the ballot, such as nomination by 5,000 party members or 100 CLPs for example, we see it as essential that the MPs open up the field as widely as possible on our behalf. We ask this simply so that a section of the party is not cut out totally from this process, rather than in the expectation of victory. It is very important that the party discuss the possibility that anti-austerity might be the way forward for our party and our people.” Stuart Wheeler, ‘We call upon Labour MPs to nominate Jeremy Corbyn as a leadership candidate to ensure party members and affiliated supporters have the opportunity to hear anti-austerity views and the chance to signal their support for an anti austerity policy,’ Change.org, May 2015, https://archive.is/jUZul.


21. For the record, after Jeremy Corbyn came Yvette Cooper, who prevaricated for over a minute while refusing to give a yes or no answer. ‘Andy Burnham Flounders At Labour Leadership Hustings,’ Jeremy Wilson channel, YouTube, 9 June 2015, https://youtu.be/307KkKTOcLs.
23. ‘Jeremy Corbyn makes his pitch for Labour leadership—BBC Newsnight,’ BBC Newsnight channel, YouTube, 8 June 2015, https://youtu.be/q-gjD6PvU0O.
25. Unsurprisingly, Burnham was frustrated when Smith deserted him, although she promised to switch back her nomination should Corbyn fail to win enough support. “I remember explaining to Andy, ‘It’s OK if Jeremy’s on the ballot paper because it almost gives you permission to take positions that are to the left, but you’ve always got someone further to the left,’” Smith says. “Strategically that’s never a bad position to be in… But it was for him.”
27. Field later gave a counterintuitive justification: “I supported Jeremy Corbyn’s nomination for the leadership because I believe that this ‘emotional spasm’ needs to be challenged.” David Williamson and Liam Murphy, ‘Birkenhead MP Frank Field defends decision to nominate Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leadership candidate,’ Liverpool Echo, 23 July 2015, https://archive.is/IREmL.
29. Later on in July, once Corbyn had become the frontrunner, the telegenic Butler became an internet star when she defended her nomination choice in an

30. Chi Onwurah, ‘Labour needs as broad a debate as possible, not just a narrow fight between two and three names,’ New Statesman, 27 May 2015, https://archive.is/WtOAB.


Onwurah got the same response on Facebook, according to Ben Sellers: “[She] went on Facebook saying that a number of her branches had nominated Jeremy but she wanted advice as to whether she should back him. Everyone in her thread encouraged her to nominate him.” David Renton, ‘Labour and the left after #jezwecan: An interview with Ben Sellers,’ rs21, 15 October 2015, https://archive.is/yruho.

33. Explaining her reasoning online Onwurah wrote: “in these leadership contests MPs act as gatekeepers... I believe it would be wrong if we were only to open the gate wide enough to let two or three candidates through. That is why I am nominating Jeremy Corbyn.” Chi Onwurah, ‘My nomination for leader of the Labour Party,’ Chi Onwurah MP, 11 June 2015, https://archive.is/y9EKD.

34. For example, Gareth Thomas, Twitter, 14 June 2015, https://archive.is/cFHyM.

36. In 2007 Twitter was just one year old and Facebook was a more closed network less suited to campaigning. Ironically, some of the changes that have since made Facebook more fertile ground for the left were designed to attract business users and advertisers.

37. This guess is based on feedback from the many volunteers who were sending in the replies they received from parliamentarians.


41. “I'd urge all my PLP Labour colleagues to think really hard about the democratic responsibility we have to our members,” Clive Lewis tweeted in response to the poll, warning that Corbyn not being on the ballot would mean “a world of post leadership election legitimacy pain.” Clive Lewis, Twitter, 12 June 2015, https://archive.is/g59ZO.


44. Corbyn4Leader, Twitter, 13 June 2015, https://archive.is/dCLpZ.
Champion even got into the spirit, joining in the digital campaign herself by tweeting: “Calling all MPs who’ve not yet nominated for leader—please support @jeremycorbyn. The party needs the broadest debate so all feel heard.” Sarah Champion, Twitter, 14 June 2015, https://archive.is/oC4cx.

Haigh first promised to nominate if Corbyn was close to having the numbers, then simply agreed to do it outright. After the private MPs’ hustings on 8 June she tweeted: “Just out of PLP hustings, @andyburnhammp by far most passionate, thoughtful and convincing candidate by a long shot.” A respondent, Duncan Hall, commented: “That’s disappointed a hell of a lot of people Louise. I thought you wanted an anti-austerity candidate?” Haigh answered: “I’m a fan of Jeremy but don’t think even he thinks he can be leader. Understand calls for nomination, will do if he needs mine.” Hall wrote: “I hope I get the chance to vote for him. MPs are in a very privileged position in choosing who we are allowed to vote for.” Haigh replied: “I completely agree and understand that.” See Louise Haigh, Twitter, 8 June 2015, https://archive.is/XEIJO.

By 11 June Haigh was saying to her Twitter interlocutors that she would endorse Jeremy Corbyn if he came close to the required number, a position that did not satisfy them. See Louise Haigh, Twitter, 11 June 2015, https://archive.is/rag7M.
Finally, on 13 June she confirmed that she would be nominating Corbyn. See Louise Haigh MP, Twitter, 13 June 2015, https://archive.is/d2SQK.


50. Efford’s tweet was seized on by the blogger Phil Burton-Cartledge, who published a piece entitled “What is Jeremy Corbyn playing at?” Was Corbyn, Burton-Cartledge wondered, “completely hapless at organising and won’t do the work necessary to mount a serious challenge”? He messaged the Corbyn4Leader Twitter account demanding: “why hasn’t he been ringing around the PLP?” Ben Sellers remembers the incident. “We [the social media team] had this semi-detached relationship—at this point anyway—from the campaign,” he says. “But we were saying ‘Why has nobody contacted Clive Efford yet?’” At the time Sellers put it down to general campaign incompetence. “I didn’t know how much work they were getting through. John McDonnell told me afterwards that Jon Lansman was on the phone continuously. But we were quite frustrated because we were saying ‘It’s there on a plate. All you have to do is contact them.’”
Corbyn4Leader, Twitter, 12 June 2015, https://archive.is/qO8ih.

51. The core team at this time included Corbyn’s son Seb, and two of his staff, Nicolette Peterson and Jack Bond.
52. This was especially true because the National Gallery action was being taken by PCS, a union not then affiliated to the Labour Party, partly in defence of Candy Udwin, a member of the Socialist Workers’ Party. See Luke James, ‘Corbyn To Speak To Rally Of National Gallery Strikers,’ Morning Star, 11 June 2015, https://archive.is/TKGO0.


57. ‘Take action: with 12 hours to go, these are the MPs yet to nominate,’ Jeremy Corbyn For Labour Leader Facebook page, 14 June 2015, https://archive.is/ZimX5.


59. On the same theme, a former “senior Labour staffer” said: “They are law-makers, they are paid to take the difficult decisions. The whole point of the [Collins] system was that they had a responsibility to think about who would be an acceptable future prime minister. Jeremy Corbyn wasn’t that, they knew it, yet they weren’t strong enough to look like bad guys by keeping him off the ballot.” Rosa Prince, Comrade Corbyn: A
A slightly different take, given by the Corbyn biographer Rosa Prince, is that “the roots of their error” lay in a misunderstanding of the precedent set by Diane Abbott’s successful effort to get on the ballot in 2010. Nominations had not been lent to Abbott so that all wings of the party would be represented, but because she was a woman and black—neither of which applied to Corbyn. Ibid., ch. 16, pp. 288, 306 (ebook version, EPUB/iPad).

In explaining their decision some MPs explicitly rejected the gatekeeper role not because they did not understand it, but because they did not like it. David Lammy, for example, tweeted: “the next Labour leader should be chosen by members and supporters, not MPs.” See David Lammy, Twitter, 15 June 2015, https://archive.is/oNzdo.

It might be notable that eight of the MPs who lent Corbyn a nomination had majorities of fewer than 5,000.


The other two mayoral candidates were Tessa Jowell, who stood down as an MP in 2015, and the journalist Christian Wolmar.

Gareth Thomas—a Liz Kendall supporter—was one of the seven MPs who promised that he would nominate Corbyn should he be within one of the required 35. David Lammy was more definite. After being called first by Seb and then by Jeremy on Sunday evening, he told...
the elder Corbyn: “I'll come into parliament and get you on.” Lammy’s decision was not entirely cynical—personal warmth towards Corbyn radiated from the explanation he posted on Facebook. “While there is enough that Jeremy and I disagree on to mean that I won’t be voting for him,” Lammy wrote, “he is a man of immense integrity and principle.” Sadiq Khan, too, had other reasons for being amenable—he had been Ed Miliband’s campaign manager in 2010 and would have been alarmed to see the other candidates trashing Miliband’s legacy.

Gareth Thomas, Twitter, 14 June 2015, https://archive.is/cFHyM.


68. Ben Bradshaw, Stella Creasy and Caroline Flint.


70. “I don’t think they spend a lot of time with the grassroots; for them politics is in the bubble,” comments Lansman.

71. Abbott would have won less than a third of the votes of either Miliband brother, however. A direct comparison
between the 2010 and 2015 contests is not possible because of the change to the eligibility rules for affiliated supporters brought about by the Collins Review. Abbott won a respectable vote among affiliated members but suffered from only winning the backing of seven MPs and MEPs, whose votes counted for more.


There was some acrimony that Abbott had displaced McDonnell in the nominations phase, and in London much of the left’s energy and personnel had been diverted into Ken Livingston’s mayoral selection campaign.

Even activists on the left, like Michael Calderbank, gave Miliband their first preference: “If everybody [on the left] voted Diane first and Ed second there was a danger that Ed would drop out,” he says. “People knew that Ed was the only way of stopping a Blairite.”


Watson and Lansman were acquainted due to the circumstance that Watson’s office in parliament was opposite that of Michael Meacher, for whom Lansman worked in his day job. When Watson resigned over the Falkirk scandal in 2013, Lansman wrote a glowing blog for Left Futures describing him as “an outstanding backbencher even when he was on the front bench.”

Jon Lansman, ‘Tom Watson—an outstanding backbencher even when he was on the front bench,’ Left Futures, 4 July 2013, https://archive.is/BbyuZ.
76. ‘Unite members call for backing for Jeremy Corbyn as Labour Leader,’ Left Futures, 12 June 2015, https://archive.is/BQmwM.

77. Watson already had the numbers he needed to make the deputy leadership ballot, but wanted to cement his support from the left. At the time, he was a politician capable of appealing across the left-right spectrum.


79. Tulip Siddiq, Twitter, 11 June 2015, https://archive.is/82ohY.


81. Jon Lansman, interview with the author.

82. Imran Hussain tweeted on Sunday evening, “We need a candidate who will oppose austerity.” Imran Hussain, Twitter, 14 June 2015, https://archive.is/GKmZE.


86. Cruddas was also being spoken to by his old ally Jon Trickett.


89. Tulip Siddiq, Twitter, 15 June 2015, https://archive.is/YfUv0.
93. Ironically another Tory MP, Tim Loughton, would later try to sign up as a £3 supporter in order to vote for Corbyn, as part of the much-overhyped Tories For Corbyn mock campaign.
95. John McDonnell, interview with the author.
97. John McDonnell says the two MPs relented with 10 seconds to go. This may be dramatic license. Jeremy Corbyn, at a rally in Birkenhead on 9 July 2015, said there were 118 seconds to go, but he was not in the room at the time. Asked about this, McDonnell says:
“Well it was bloody close. It was bloody close.” See ‘LIVE: Jeremy Corbyn holds final campaign rally in Islington North,’ Ruptly TV channel, YouTube, 10 September 2015, https://youtu.be/KDE8ruratsc.

98. Jon Lansman, interview with the author.

102. Chi Onwurah, Twitter, 15 June 2015, https://archive.is/34VmA.

Chapter 6: Team Corbyn

2. Polly Toynbee, ‘This was the week the Labour leadership contest turned nasty,’ Guardian, 23 July 2015, https://archive.is/BduXm.


Corbyn has since won the beard of the year title in 2015 and 2016: an incredible seven times. See Frances Perraudin, ‘Jeremy Corbyn wins parliamentary beard of the year by a whisker,’ 11 December 2015, https://archive.is/9MF3l.

Beard Liberation Front, ‘Corbyn beard & eyebrow combo at Prime Minister’s Questions leads to record Parliamentary Beard Award success,’ Kmfleet’s Blog, 9 December 2016, https://archive.is/92gMk.


5. Though it is difficult to deny that some of Corbyn’s clothing choices were truly terrible, Smith admits now that it would have been the “wrong thing to do” to change him. “In the end I think that Jeremy’s appearance was part of his charm. I stand corrected on that,” she says. After David Cameron told Corbyn he should put on a proper suit and do up his tie during prime minister’s questions in February 2016 (mistaking, as usual, nastiness for humour), Corbyn joked: “He’s
actually jealous of the jacket. You know what he’s really jealous of? That I can go shopping in the greatest shopping centre in the world, Holloway Road N7, and he’s stuck with Bond Street.” Others of his garments, such as his grey Wilson shell suit, were so bad they attained cult status. Ned Simons, ‘Jeremy Corbyn Loves His Grey Tracksuit And Won’t Be Binning It,’ Huffington Post, 1 March, 2016, https://archive.is/0TiCt.


8. Source requested anonymity, interview with the author.

9. These varying expectations are all quoted from interviews with the author.


11. The 75,000 includes not just t-shirts but badges, leaflets and other merchandise. For an image of the first t-shirt see Ben Sellers, ‘#JezWeDid: from Red Labour to Jeremy Corbyn—a tale from social media,’ The World Turned Upside Down, 27 September 2015, https://archive.is/2CVNB.


14. Although not at the meeting, Byron Taylor from TULO (the Trade Union and Labour Party Liaison
Organisation) was also urging the recruitment of Fletcher, whom he had been impressed with when the latter was Ed Miliband’s trade union liaison officer.

15. There was also the consideration that Fletcher’s time working for Miliband had put him on what the Labour left regarded as the wrong side of the argument over the Collins Review.

Socialist Action has often been portrayed in the media as a sinister underground sect—especially during Livingstone’s time as Mayor when opponents found it useful to focus on the preponderance of Socialist Action members among his staff. But the group was viewed less excitably by others on the left, who joked that its strategy could be summed up as ‘the networking road to socialism’ for its success in getting members into influential jobs. Despite having a name that suggested a ‘to the barricades’ mentality, Socialist Action’s approach to specific issues was generally more cautious than that of some other parts of the left.

‘Hoist by its own petard,’ Labour Party Marxists, 3 September 2015, https://archive.is/6iYu0.


19. Midgley was fresh from working on another leadership campaign the previous year—that of the left MSP Neil Findlay, who ran for Scottish Labour leader (and came second)—and so had recent hands-on experience. It was on Findlay’s recommendation that McDonnell recruited Midgley. Usefully, she had formerly been head of political strategy at Unite.

20. In December 2015 there was a media storm over a complaint made to the Information Commissioner claiming that, in the words of the BBC, “information gathered during the leadership campaign has been kept by Momentum.” Amid howls of rage about Momentum’s dastardly plan to deselect ‘moderate’ MPs and wild talk of it facing a half a million pound fine for breaching data protection law, none of its accusers considered the possibility that Team Corbyn might have been smart enough to plan ahead. Ross Hawkins, ‘Jeremy Corbyn support campaign Momentum faces investigation,’ BBC News, 10 December 2015, https://archive.is/gmm1L.

‘Labour Row Over Momentum Data Grab,’ Techno Guido, 10 November 2015, https://archive.is/jul3Q.


21. Halligan was also the North West point man for Tom Watson’s deputy leadership campaign until, after six weeks, he realised that doing both jobs was unsustainable.

22. Fletcher had been elected president of the National Union of Students in 2004 on an anti-tuition fees platform, beating the usually dominant Labour Students from the left. She subsequently became a councillor in
Islington and within two years was deputy mayor of the borough.

23. Alex Smith, ‘CLP nominations,’ LabourList, 16 June 2010, https://archive.is/vtEdM. Analysis of the 2010 figures showed that in Labour-held constituencies the incidence of the local party nominating the same candidate as their MP was 73 per cent. Given Corbyn’s scant support among his parliamentary colleagues this did not bode well. Sunder Katwala, ‘CLP nominations reinforce MPs’ endorsements,’ Left Foot Forward, 27 July 2010, https://archive.is/LyMga.

24. “If 30 CLPs were meeting on a particular Thursday we wouldn’t have enough volunteers to ring through anything like the membership of 30 CLPs,” says one campaign source.

25. Lansman credits Halligan’s efforts for the selection of Rebecca Long-Bailey as the parliamentary candidate for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears’ old seat, where the Blairites put up a tough fight) and Rachael Maskell’s selection in York. These skills transferred to the CLP nominations battle. According to Marshajane Thompson, “Without Alex people wouldn’t have known when their CLPs were meeting, people wouldn’t have had speakers at CLPs across the three countries. He coordinated all of that and worked 24 hour days making sure everything was done.”

26. This is not the same anonymous source as that quoted immediately before. Both are from interviews with the author.

28. Cat Smith, interview with the author.

The CLP nominations were coming in thick and fast. Two days later, 19 July, Jeremy Corbyn had won 70 while Burnham was on 68. See Frances Perraudin, ‘Labour leadership: Andy Burnham keeps door open for Jeremy Corbyn,’ Guardian, 19 July 2015, https://archive.is/B5GsI.


31. It is impossible to know precisely how instrumental the campaign machinery was because other factors were at play, such as Unite’s endorsement on 5 July which cemented Corbyn as a plausible candidate. But if phone canvassing and organisation did not work, political parties would not spend so much money on them.

32. Initially the phone banking was targeted at party members—most trade unionists and £3 supporters were yet to be registered.

33. “From week one to week two to week three, the proportions moved around a bit, but it looked like we had a good sample and it was just being consistently updated as the sample size grew,” says a member of the team. “The support did go up, but it was comparatively steady, which was the most pleasing thing about the stats.”


36. A YouGov poll conducted 27-29 July 2010 found David Miliband had a lead over his brother in the first preference votes of members of 38 per cent to 32, although once further preferences were considered it evened up to 50-50. See ‘Labour Party leadership election, 2010,’ Wikipedia, https://archive.is/CO8cX. See also Michael Crick, ‘All to play for between Milibands in leadership contest,’ BBC News, 29 July 2010, https://archive.is/f9xyX.

37. The figure of 48,000 is derived from a report that Labour’s membership had increased by 68,000 since the general election as of 28 July 2015. The same report stated that 20,000 of those had joined since the leadership election nominations closed. See Patrick Wintour, ‘Harriet Harman: we are weeding out bogus Labour leadership voters,’ Guardian, 28 July 2015, https://archive.is/tnYEx.


39. “We found that each successive wave—if you separate them into people who joined pre-2010; under Ed Miliband; the wave who joined after the general election in May before Jeremy was on the ballot paper; and then after Jeremy was on the ballot paper—each successive wave got better and better,” says Jon Lansman. “Quite dramatically better and better.”
Chapter 7: A Movement Looking for a Home


2. The definition of a “movement” in this context is, like the phenomenon itself, somewhat fuzzy. At the general level it is simple enough: a movement is a coming together of people for the purpose of changing some aspect of the political or social status quo. It is the attempt to move from one situation to another that lends it the name, and a successful movement grows through this motion, like a snowball rolling down a hill. But beyond that the term is applied in a variety of ways. It is often used interchangeably with the name of an organisation, such as the Stop the War Coalition; or to describe a great cause, such as Palestinian rights; or to refer to a campaign for a specific policy, such as for the living wage; or in relation to the struggle of a particular group against discrimination, such as the LGBT+
community. On the left there is a tendency to regard any non-party political group campaigning for progressive change—irrespective of the scale of support for its message—as a “social movement.” Some of those who were involved in the Corbyn campaign refer casually to “the movements” as shorthand for the non-Labour activists of the left who swung behind their candidate, although in reality there were no dividing walls—many members of the party were themselves involved in various movements. It is also the case that, although there is a plethora of different causes and campaigns, they are propelled and supported by largely the same pool of leftish people—the environmental movement, for example, contains activists who are just as involved in the tax justice movement.

3. In the mid-1980s a conscious attempt was made to fuse at least the Bennite Labour left and the new movements through a series of gatherings known as the Chesterfield Socialist Conferences. The ethos of these events lives on in the personal politics of many of the participants, including Corbyn. “Jeremy is just one of a modest band of Labour MPs… who don’t ask to see your party card before joining struggles and debates beyond the walls of Westminster,” the feminist socialist author Hilary Wainwright, who was heavily involved in the Chesterfield conferences, has written. Hilary Wainwright, ‘My support for Jeremy Corbyn is about much more than “reclaiming Labour,”’ Red Pepper, July 2015, https://archive.is/7VP5k.

4. This was in contrast to the 2016 contest when the opposite impulse resulted in only members of more than six months' standing being allowed to vote.

5. Lansman expected to recruit 50,000 registered supporters. In the end, 88,449 registered supporters voted for Corbyn; the other three candidates combined won the votes of just 17,149.


8. Corbyn’s leadership rivals all turned down the opportunity to address the People’s Assembly demonstration. Matthew Weaver, ‘People’s Assembly pans Burnham, Cooper and Kendall for “rally no-show,”’ Guardian, 16 June 2015, https://archive.is/DOIyc.


10. There was a Greece Solidarity Campaign rally in Trafalgar Square on 23 June 2015, another on 29 June, and a rally on 6 July.

‘Break the chains of Greece’s debt! Rally Trafalgar Square Tuesday 23rd June 6.30,’ Greece Solidarity, 22 June 2015, https://archive.is/alrdM.

‘Solidarity with Greece, Mon 29 June, Trafalgar Square,’ Greece Solidarity Campaign, 29 June 2015, https://archive.is/14p3S.

‘Celebrate Greece’s victory!’ Greece Solidarity Campaign, 5 July 2015, https://archive.is/6e36E.
15. Lindsey German, ‘Why Stop the War supports Jeremy Corbyn’s campaign to be Labour Party leader,’ Stop the War Coalition, 16 June 2015, https://archive.is/gXkIf. Later, in August, Stop the War helped organise the most famous rally of the campaign at the Camden Centre in London. Sam Coates, ‘Crowd salute their hard-left superstar,’ Times, 4 August 2015, https://archive.is/0MyII.
17. Nicholas Watt, ‘Jeremy Corbyn: “We are not doing celebrity, personality or abusive politics—this is about hope,”’ Guardian, 7 August 2015, https://archive.is/bfsjk.
18. The End of History and the Last Man was a 1992 book by Francis Fukuyama claiming that the conclusion of
the Cold War meant that ideological evolution had reached its end point with Western liberal democracy.

19. The alter-globalisation movement announced itself to the world in the ‘Battle of Seattle’ in 1999. Its high point was the 2001 summit of the G8, held in Genoa, Italy. Its target was no less than global capitalism. “Our resistance is as transnational as capital,” ran the slogan.

20. The anti-war movement that emerged was on a different scale from the alter-globalisation movement, capable of putting millions on to the streets in cities around the world, including 2 million in London on 15 February 2003 in opposition to the invasion of Iraq. Corbyn was a central figure in the Stop The War Coalition that organised that protest.


21. Youth unemployment in Spain in May 2011, as the occupations began, was 45.3 per cent; in Greece it was 42.6 per cent (in February 2013 it would top 60 per cent). Figures from Eurostat represented in graphs from YCharts. For Spain, see ‘Spain Youth Unemployment Rate,’ YCharts, 4 April 2016, https://archive.is/4rmaY. For Greece, see ‘Greece Youth Unemployment Rate,’ YCharts, 4 April 2016, https://archive.is/QkuhA.


24. Ibid. The description was made by Nasos Iliopoulos, secretary of the youth wing of Synaspismos, the biggest party within what was then the Syriza coalition.
27. As one of Corbyn’s long-time collaborators Hilary Wainwright has argued: “The economic and political conditions for social democracy no longer exist… The world of a mixed economy, where the profits of a productive capitalist sector could be taxed and redistributed to provide universal welfare, social security and a public infrastructure for the benefit of all... has been replaced by a financialised global capitalism, where financial flows shape politics rather than politics intervening in a productive economy tied to territory and geographic markets.” Hilary Wainwright, ‘My support for Jeremy Corbyn is about much more than “reclaiming Labour,”’ Red Pepper, July 2015, https://archive.is/7VP5k.
28. The influence of Occupy was unmistakeable in Bernie Sanders’ rhetoric about the 1 per cent—or, as he preferred to put it, the “top one-tenth of one per cent”—and the unaccountable power of Wall Street. A Washington Post journalist reported from a Sanders rally: “I’m struck by how many young Bernie organisers I’ve met today got activated by the Occupy movement.” Dave Weigel, Twitter, 9 February 2016, https://archive.is/nGBke.
29. Initially, austerity in Britain had an analogous result to austerity in Europe—nearly sending the country into
another recession. The programme that George Osborne followed in his first two years as chancellor proved so calamitous that he took fright and abruptly eased the pace of austerity in 2012, while pretending that he had done no such thing. Yet the government defended its policy as if Britain was just like Greece and Spain. “The same language was being used to justify it,” says an advisor to Corbyn’s campaign. “I don’t believe austerity is the right policy for Greece but economically Greece was unsustainable whereas Britain wasn’t. But the language was: ‘Britain is unsustainable so therefore we have to balance the books, so public services have got to be cut.’”

30. John Millington, ‘Students shake the halls of power,’ Morning Star, 10 November 2010, https://archive.is/5g0d5.


For an example of the establishment’s reaction, Conservative cabinet minister Michael Gove told the BBC’s Andrew Marr programme on 13 September 2015: “I do worry, as we saw even in the last parliament with organisations like UK Uncut, that there are some people who want to bring protest on to the street. I think it’s important that we keep our politics civilised.” See ‘Jeremy Corbyn’s supporters want to bring protest on to the street, says Gove,’ Guardian, 13 September 2015, https://archive.is/tBN8H.
40. The Green surge gathered pace throughout 2014. The Greens had around 15,000 members at the start of that year; by December they had 30,000; then a sharp spike in January 2015 saw 20,000 more join.
42. Part of the anti-austerity movement flowed into the SNP, reanimating its base. Separately, it organised itself into the Radical Independence Campaign.

43. This metaphor is borrowed from Tom Walker, Salman Shaheen and Pete Green, ‘The impossible has happened—so we need to change direction,’ Left Unity, 18 November 2015, https://archive.is/TN5H9.

44. The boundaries between these categories were always blurred (there was crossover between neoliberal and ‘old right’ Brownites, for example) but the party contained three discernable ideological heritages.

Chapter 8: Power in a Union


2. Andy Burnham won the backing of the large (over 400,000-strong) USDAW union and the smaller UCATT and Musicians’ Union. Cooper was supported by the steel workers’ union Community and the once
mighty NUM miners’ union, sadly now a tiny organisation. Three affiliated unions, BECTU, GMB and Unity, made no nomination.

For more on the historical relationship between the unions and Labour, see Lewis Minkin, The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party (Edinburgh University Press, 1992).


7. Billy Hayes, the former general secretary of CWU, gave another reason for the left’s success in union elections—the Labour right gave up trying to win back the unions, in part because of the mechanisms imposed by Margaret Thatcher’s union laws. In the mandatory elections for union leaders, turnout is generally low and dominated by activists, who tend to vote left. See Alex Nunns, ‘What became of the Labour Left?’ Red Pepper, September 2007, https://archive.is/LD5hu.

8. ‘The awkward squad’ included the likes of Tony Woodley at the Transport and General union, Billy
Hayes at the CWU, Andy Gilchrist at the FBU, and Bob Crow at the RMT, as well as general secretaries of unions not then affiliated to the Labour Party such as Mark Serwotka at the PCS and Jeremy Dear at the NUJ. This point has been made by Hilary Wainwright, who argues that Ralph Miliband’s prediction that the Labour Party could not have a socialist leadership has been disproved in part because of the changed position of the unions. “A sustained integration of the trade unions into capitalism of the kind that [Ralph] Miliband saw as a condition of the Labour Party’s power structure, ensuring that the union leadership would accept the confines of parliamentarism and Labourism, requires a stable corporatist arrangement whereby the trade unions are acquiescent and integrated at the factory or company level along the lines of arrangements which may still have some viability in Germany. Such conditions do not hold in the UK, or indeed in most other capitalist counties today. Miliband could not foresee that this, together with new forms of ‘popular insubordination,’ might lead to the breakdown of the PLP-trade union leadership alliance at the apex of Labour’s power structure.” Hilary Wainwright, ‘Radicalizing the movement-party relation: from Ralph Miliband to Jeremy Corbyn and beyond,’ in Leo Panitch and Gregory Albo (eds), Rethinking Revolution: Socialist Register 2017 (Merlin Press, 2016).

TULO had existed since 1994, but had been muted. Tony Blair was determined it should have no input into party policy, and union leaders acquiesced. From 2003, under the chairmanship of Tony Dubbins (who led the NGA print union in the infamous Wapping strike against Rupert Murdoch in the 1980s), and with Byron Taylor as
national officer, TULO set about finding a way to re-establish the union voice in Labour’s policy-making process.

11. Billy Hayes, then general secretary of CWU, representing postal workers, saw this as a good illustration of the extent of union sway: securing the pledge was a big achievement, but unions also had to swallow glowing language about the liberalisation of postal markets—which paved the way for privatisation under the Coalition government. See Alex Nunns, ‘What became of the Labour Left?’ Red Pepper, September 2007, https://archive.is/LD5hu.

Billy Hayes’ successor as CWU general secretary, Dave Ward, later called this a “three card trick” to privatisation. See ‘Dave Ward – Corbyn the antidote to Blairite Virus pt1/3,’ chunkymark channel, YouTube, 5 August 2015, https://youtu.be/pMjtLNbM3lY.

12. This was illustrated by TULO’s leading lights, Dubbins and Taylor, both of whom had been on the right of their unions prior to New Labour, but were now recast as ardent leftists.


14. A fairly typical example: “[Miliband] will do it the way he is told by the trade unions who bought and paid for his shock leadership victory. [He] is the prisoner of public sector dinosaurs who now hold Labour’s purse strings, dictate policy and choose Labour MPs.” Trevor Kavanagh, ‘Why Red Ed will never lead Britain,’ Sun, 2 June 2013, https://archive.is/FMRG9.

15. See chapter 2.


At the ‘Unions Together’ leadership hustings, organised by TULO in Camden Town Hall on 30 June 2015, Corbyn was clearly the candidate most steeped in the trade union movement, with the policies to match. ‘Labour Party Leadership Hustings,’ Unions Together, 2015, https://archive.is/mexuX.


20. At the time of the LRC’s launch in 2004 both RMT and FBU had recently left the Labour Party—RMT was expelled for allowing branches to affiliate to the Scottish Socialist Party; FBU disaffiliated after coming into confrontation with the Labour government over strike action. Lewis Minkin, The Blair Supremacy: A study in the politics of Labour’s Party Management (Manchester University Press, 2014), p. 591.
21. Corbyn’s attitude paid immediate dividends once he became leader, as FBU re-affiliated to the party in November 2015. Labour activist James Doran says: “There was no moderation in terms of having to impose a divide between who is and who isn’t a Labour Party member within the workers’ movement. Like, for example, Jeremy going along to support Candy Udwin, who was victimised at the National Gallery by the employers. It was not a problem that Candy is a member of the Socialist Workers Party, or that the PCS union that represents the workers there was not affiliated to the Labour Party… It was just, ‘That’s what we do.’”

22. The leadership of Unison, for example, seemed to be on constant guard against its own left wing activists.

23. Founded in 1871 as a get together for the coal mining communities of the North East, the Durham Miners’ Gala survived the destruction of the pits and remains one of the biggest political gatherings in Europe. On Corbyn’s odds with the bookies, see James Nickerson and Billy Ehrenberg, ‘Labour leadership odds 2015: When did it start to look like Jeremy Corbyn


26. This account of how Unite came to nominate Jeremy Corbyn for leader has been substantially revised since the first edition of this book to accommodate new information, including an interview with Len McCluskey. Previously the discussion of what happened at Unite’s 5 July 2015 executive council meeting was based on media reports and interviews with people who were not in the room. For Unite’s membership see ‘Annual Return for a Trade Union,’ June 2015, https://gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/443403/795T_2014.pdf.


29. Jon Lansman, ‘Left strengthens its control of Unite exec, but it’s not all good news (with full results),’ Left Futures, 27 April 2014, https://archive.is/ZbwLY. The strength and political orientation of the United Left was a legacy of Unite's forerunner union, the T&G. Unite was formed out of a merger of the T&G and
another large union, Amicus, in 2007. The T&G had a long tradition as a left union. In the New Labour era the left extended its position in the union, to the extent that on eve of the merger its entire executive bar a handful of members belonged to the T&G’s equivalent of the United Left, called the Broad Left. Amicus, on the other hand, was the product of a 2001 merger between unions, one of which was the AEEU, the most prominent union on the right. At the time of the merger, Amicus’ executive was split between left and right. But when the new, merged Unite executive was formed, the combination of the left factions in the T&G and Amicus gave the United Left a majority which then grew in subsequent years.

30. Martin Mayer was not a member of the executive council at the time (he had been previously) but he had influence as chair of the United Left.


32. Jon Lansman, ‘Left strengthens its control of Unite exec, but it’s not all good news (with full results),’ Left Futures, 27 April 2014, https://archive.is/ZbwLY.

33. Five of the executive council members were either not in attendance or did not vote. See Jon Lansman, ‘Be in no doubt: Jeremy Corbyn could win this contest,’ Left Futures, 6 July 2015, https://archive.is/LjMQ7.

34. For Unison’s membership see ‘Annual Return for a Trade Union, June 2015,
As far back as 2003, general secretary Dave Prentis had privately apologised to other union leaders for Unison having allowed the party machine to divide them. One of Unison’s most divisive ex-officials, Nita Clarke, by then worked for Tony Blair in Number 10. See Lewis Minkin, The Blair Supremacy: A Study in the Politics of Labour’s Party Management (Manchester University Press, 2014), p. 565.

The Labour Link national committee was Unison’s equivalent of the political committee in other unions. Andrew Berry, one of its members, was told the procedures it decided to follow to choose which candidate to nominate were no different from in the past.

Prentis was already slightly on the back foot over his handling of a local government pay dispute in 2014. Conrad Landin, “Women Are The Majority. We Must Be Heard,” Morning Star, 10 September 2015, https://archive.is/RiW4Y.

One region opted for Burnham—his own, the North West, and by a single vote. The only region to choose Cooper was also the only one to have completed its consultation before the Welfare Bill controversy.

The make-up of the 23-strong committee was half elected delegates representing the regions, and half appointed members from the union’s national executive council.


For GMB’s membership see ‘Annual Return for a Trade Union,’ June 2015,
‘John McDonnell defends Keith Henderson against dismissal as officer of the GMB,’ Labour Representation Committee, 13 November 2013, https://archive.is/7cmJS.

It was the trade union equivalent of Samuel L Jackson in the film Pulp Fiction: inscrutable, strangely endearing, but essentially a bad something-or-other. ‘Pulp Fiction - bad mother fucker wallet scene,’ emcomdotno channel, YouTube, 11 Aug 2012, https://youtu.be/NUuwd8ZOl_4.


The statement continued: “We reject the notion that Labour needs to move to the centre ground of British politics. The centre ground has moved significantly to the right in recent years. We do not see arguing for fairer wealth distribution, decent jobs with good pay, terms and conditions and a substantial increase in affordable housing for the next generation as a left wing agenda. Jeremy agrees with the vast amount of CWU policy, ranging from opposing the selling-off of Royal Mail to offering a real alternative to austerity and repealing anti-trade union laws.” ‘CWU backs Jeremy
Corbyn for Labour Leader,’ Communication Workers Union, 30 July 2015, https://archive.is/E30FA.

48. It was amusing to hear a BBC newsreader introduce a segment with the words: “The Labour leadership candidate Liz Kendall has said it was ‘offensive’ for a union leader to suggest that those linked to Tony Blair were a virus.” ‘CWU General Secretary Dave Ward Discusses CWU’s support of Jeremy Corbyn on BBC News,’ CWUTV channel, YouTube, 31 July 2015, https://youtu.be/YeJYn_ZJYEI.


48. The tone of Ward’s intervention may not have helped the Corbyn campaign. It jarred with the strategy of making a virtue of Corbyn’s virtue. Lansman recalls that he “bought a shirt which had a virus design on it and I was going to wear it at the result conference [on 12 September 2015] but I was banned from doing that by the rest of the team. It wasn’t sufficiently inclusive, apparently.”

50. Corbyn was also endorsed by two affiliated socialist societies, the Socialist Educational Association and the Socialist Health Association.

50. ‘Great debate and discussion at this year’s SEA Conference,’ Socialist Educational Association, 29 June 2015, https://archive.is/0CrWB.


51. Although Prison Officers’ Association (POA) members, like those of the other non-affiliates, did not get a vote via their union, the POA urged them to pay £3 to have their say as registered supporters. Steve Gillan, ‘POA

52. ‘Labour leadership results in full,’ BBC News, 12 September 2015, https://archive.is/c9ifF.

53. This situation had its roots in the 2010 leadership contest. There had been controversy over some unions sending out ballot papers in envelopes covered with promotional messages for Ed Miliband. This became part of a Blairite fable portraying David Miliband as a wronged man, cheated out of the top job by ‘union barons’ with untold powers to manipulate their innocent and impressionable members. The purpose of the second ‘opt in’ required by the Collins Review was to get union members’ consent to be put in direct contact with Labour, allowing the party to send out ballot papers centrally. It seemed an awful lot of trouble for the sake of plain envelopes. The unions predicted the system would dramatically reduce the numbers taking part. While it would be possible to get union members to sign up, they said, it would be time consuming and costly, and not a good use of resources for industrial organisations.
‘Number of voters in leadership contest revised down to 550,000,’ LabourList, 25 August 2015, https://archive.is/Nt7Zi.
54. The figure was subsequently revised down to “something like 94,000,” primarily due to existing party members having signed up by mistake. Martin Mayer, interview with the author.


56. See chapter 2. A separate question was whether the smaller number of votes from affiliated supporters as compared to other categories indicated that the Corbyn phenomenon was not as deep in the unions as it was in the party and the social movements. Was enthusiasm for Corbyn limited to just a layer of union activists? It was impossible to draw firm conclusions in 2015 on the basis of a convoluted new system. In the 2016 leadership contest, the absolute number of votes Corbyn received from affiliated supporters rose to 60,075 and his share of the vote rose slightly to 60.2 per cent. Overall, affiliated supporters accounted for 20 per cent of the total ballot, up from 17 per cent the year before. This was more impressive than it looked, given the expanded size of the party membership, which will have included many who voted as trade unionists in 2015. Of course, the unions had only had one extra year to recruit affiliated supporters. But the 2016 contest still left the impression that far more needed to be done to engage the millions of trade union members.

57. ‘The Register of Members’ Financial Interests, As at 16th May 2016: Corbyn, Jeremy,’ House of Commons, 18 May 2016, https://archive.is/0JxyO.

58. Ibid.

59. Neither Andy Burnham, Yvette Cooper nor Liz Kendall received donations from trade unions. Burnham took in
£333,164.12 in large donations in the course of the campaign, according to the register of members’ interests. Cooper received £312,456.56, including £100,000 from Ken and Barbara Follett. Kendall lagged behind the others with £153,825 in large donations.


60. Steve Hawkes, ‘Jeremy Corbyn’s Incredible Labour Leadership Campaign in Numbers,’ Sun Nation, 10 September 2015, https://archive.is/7LifS.


62. Andrew Berry praises Unison for getting the word out to members with texts and emails that were fulsome in their support for Corbyn. He says he “heard a figure that 22,000 were registered.” But from a big membership that was not a large number.

Chapter 9: Division Bell


On the leaked civil service advice and fears about homelessness, see Patrick Butler and Shiv Malik, ‘Benefit cap could drop 40,000 children into poverty, leaked memo warns,’ Guardian, 29 May 2015, https://archive.is/X0c2b.

The benefits cap was lowered to £20,000 or £23,000 in London.

2. It was a curious argument to make on the issue of child tax credits. Throughout the general election campaign David Cameron had been dogged by the accusation that he would cut the benefit, to the point where, by any normal understanding of the English language, he had ruled it out. When the policy then popped up in George Osborne’s post-election “emergency” budget on 8 July 2015, Yvette Cooper said it meant the prime minister had told a “lie.” As Daily Mirror journalist Ros Wynne-Jones pithily put it in a tweet:

“Cam: ‘I won’t cut tax credits if elected.’
Osb: ‘We’re cutting tax credits now we’re elected.’
Harman: ‘We have to listen to [the] electorate’?!”

Nicholas Watt and Frances Perraudin, ‘Cuts to tax credits in budget hit women twice as hard as men, says Labour,’ Guardian, 8 July 2015, https://archive.is/68C8o.


3. Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt, ‘The Corbyn earthquake—how Labour was shaken to its


5. Ibid.


12. Peter Dominiczak, ‘David Cameron to reduce benefits cap to £23,000 immediately if he wins the election,’ Telegraph, 26 January 2015, https://archive.is/aDAbV.


19. Rachael Reeves said: “Labour supports a benefit cap to ensure people are always better off in work than on benefits and we will support a reduction in the cap... to ensure this principle is met.” Patrick Butler and Shiv Malik, ‘Benefit cap could drop 40,000 children into poverty, leaked memo warns,’ Guardian, 29 May 2015, https://archive.is/X0c2b.

20. Before dropping her bombshell on the Sunday Politics, Harriet Harman made sure to first win the support for her stance of both Rachael Reeves and shadow chancellor Chris Leslie, who was backing Cooper—a necessity given they were the relevant shadow ministers, but also tactically useful for binding the Burnham and Cooper camps. Patrick Wintour, ‘Harriet Harman’s wake-up call roused Labour to anger,’ Guardian, 13 July 2015, https://archive.is/qdfJf.


22. For example, the episode was given great prominence in the Guardian’s long-form account of the leadership contest, while almost no attention was paid to the movement that coalesced behind Corbyn. Factors such as social media were not mentioned. See Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt, ‘The Corbyn earthquake—how Labour was shaken to its foundations,’ Guardian, 25 September 2015, https://archive.is/EqmPQ.

23. James Schneider, interview with the author.


26. There was a fascinating epilogue to the Welfare Bill saga. Eight months after the vote, Conservative work and pensions secretary Iain Duncan Smith dramatically resigned from the government over its approach to welfare. The immediate trigger was new cuts to disability benefits, announced by George Osborne in his March 2016 budget. But Duncan Smith also launched an extraordinary assault on the government’s whole welfare strategy, saying, among other things, that the benefits cap was “arbitrary” and that people receiving working-age benefits had been targeted for cuts
because “they don’t vote for us.” Remarkably, it appeared that under Harriet Harman’s stewardship Labour had strayed to the right of Duncan Smith, a right wing Tory despised by disability and poverty campaigners. “It’s just astonishing, isn’t it?” comments John McDonnell. “It is a shocker even now, looking back.”

Duncan Smith’s resignation brought into sharp relief how much the political narrative on welfare had changed since the previous summer. The Conservatives found themselves under pressure because the conversation had become far more focused on the people suffering as a result of government policy—who had previously gone almost unmentioned, including by Harman. The Labour Party was now arguing that their suffering was completely unnecessary, setting it in the context of an ideological austerity agenda. For Clive Lewis, this transformation vindicated the key strategic contention of Jeremy Corbyn’s candidacy—that Labour should not accommodate itself to a narrative set by the Tories but should change the terms of engagement. “The Labour Party has shown a clear, definitive difference in approach on austerity… which before we were far tamer on,” he says. “That has shone a torch on those decisions that [the Conservatives are] making and put them into stark contrast to where we stand, whereas before it was a grey blur, to be honest. That kind of moral, political definition is what an opposition should be doing. That has pressured them.”

The more robust approach could boast practical successes—Labour forced the government into a U-turn on cuts to working tax credits in November 2015, a dramatic juxtaposition to the party’s previous
acquiescence over restrictions to child tax credits in the Welfare Bill. And in March 2016, just prior to Duncan Smith’s resignation, the government had backed down over its changes to disability benefits after Corbyn focussed attention on the issue by putting it front and centre in his budget response speech.

“Fiscal self-imposed restraints,” said Duncan Smith while explaining his resignation on the Andrew Marr programme, “are more and more perceived as distinctly political rather than in the national economic interest.” He might just as well have directly quoted Corbyn’s campaign slogan that austerity is a political choice not an economic necessity.


Chapter 10: Panic in the Media

1. ‘Labour MPs “morons” to consider Jeremy Corbyn for leader—Newsnight,’ BBC Newsnight channel, YouTube, 21 July 2015, https://youtu.be/9xNx3c_jmt0.

2. Polly Toynbee, ‘This was the week the Labour leadership contest turned nasty,’ Guardian, 23 July 2015, https://archive.is/BduXm.


5. Editorial, ‘A disputed legacy: Tony Blair’s domestic achievements have been overshadowed by foreign debacles, but at least he made Labour electable,’ Independent, 23 July 2015, https://archive.is/Ws7L5.


In the same vein, one Daily Telegraph editorial dismissed Labour as “politically inept,” while the same day’s front page headline shouted: “Corbyn would cost families £2,400”—a figure provided by Tory cabinet minister Matthew Hancock, a source with no obvious axe to grind.

‘Counting the cost of Corbyn,’ Telegraph, 14 August 2015, https://archive.is/47hzh.

Ben Riley-Smith and Laura Hughes, ‘Corbyn would cost families £2,400,’ Telegraph, 13 August 2015, https://archive.is/FOWgm.
11. ‘Blame Labour’s useful idiots for the Corbyn surge,’ Telegraph, 18 August 2015, https://archive.is/vyNGH.


13. Sanchez Manning, ‘Take me out? No, Jeremy liked a night in eating cold beans with his cat called Harold Wilson, Corbyn’s first wife reveals,’ Daily Mail, 16 August 2015, https://archive.is/FkIqY.

14. David Thomas, ‘Prime Minister Corbyn… and the 1,000 days that destroyed Britain: As this brilliant imagining of a Corbyn premiership reveals, Tories who gloat over Labour’s woe should be careful what they wish for…’ Mail on Sunday, 23 August 2015, https://archive.is/NvmRp.


15. Suzanne Moore, ‘I could pay £3 to have a say, but why would I intrude on Labour’s private grief?’ Guardian, 22 July 2015, https://archive.is/wnkWC.


18. Christina Patterson later repeated the point, this time excluding ISIS, on her blog. See ‘Jeremy Corbyn and the new “sincere” politics,’ Christina Patterson website, 5 October 2015, https://archive.is/MBWaQ.
19. Disclosure: the author writes for Red Pepper but had no involvement in its editorial decision. Cover image tweeted by Red Pepper, Twitter, 15 September 2015, https://archive.is/QU6UD. See also co-editor Hilary Wainwright’s insightful editorial: Hilary Wainwright, ‘My support for Jeremy Corbyn is about much more than “reclaiming Labour,”’ Red Pepper, July 2015, https://archive.is/7VP5k. The Ecologist carried an article headlined ‘The Ecologist is for Corbyn’ which stated: “So who’s The Ecologist for? Corbyn, of course.” However an “important clarification” at the end of the article stated that it was the “purely personal viewpoint” of the editor. See Oliver Tickell, ‘The Ecologist is for Corbyn,’ Ecologist, 20 August 2015, https://archive.is/X4dyi.

20. ‘Record View: Jeremy Corbyn offers fresh hope for our nation and that is why we back him for Labour leader,’ Daily Record, 18 August 2015, https://archive.is/uDU1X.

21. The Independent’s coverage was mixed—it did provide space for positive pieces, but carried some vicious attacks, including one by senior reporter Andy McSmith that used Corbyn’s painful marriage break-up in 1999 to argue that he “is a stranger to responsibility” and “an adolescent... who is not in the least interested in how his cherished principles impact on the outside world.” The Independent also achieved the distinction of running by far the worst article published during the contest. A comment piece by Sarah Solemani, an actress and Yvette Cooper supporter, was so cluttered with illogical assertions and unintelligible language (Cooper would “unleash a new commonality, to refashion the country within a new global paradigm”) that its preposterous conclusion came as a relief for at least being
comprehensible: “So go ahead, ignore Cooper, vote Corbyn in, kiss goodbye to a Labour government and then pretend you don’t have blood on your hands. Let women be murdered by their violent husbands as the refuges shut down, watch as the mobs grow outside abortion clinics and women’s reproductive rights become rewritten, let the corpses of migrants in the Mediterranean sea float past the super yachts of the tax evaders this government opens its borders to. Confine the NHS to the history books, destroy legal aid, close down Kids charities and let the food banks flood in.”

Sarah Solemani, ‘Voting for Jeremy Corbyn is deluded. For the love of Labour, pick Yvette Cooper,’ Independent, 18 August 2015, https://archive.is/KoySR.

Andy McSmith, ‘Jeremy Corbyn is a stranger to responsibility and will loathe leadership,’ Independent, 25 August 2015, https://archive.is/l9zxK.


27. Noam Chomsky articulated this idea in a US context: “I don’t bother writing about Fox News. It is too easy. What I talk about are the liberal intellectuals, the ones who portray themselves and perceive themselves as challenging power, as courageous, as standing up for truth and justice. They are basically the guardians of the faith. They set the limits. They tell us how far we can go. They say, ‘Look how courageous I am.’ But do not go one millimetre beyond that. At least for the educated sectors, they are the most dangerous in supporting power.” See Chris Hedges, ‘Noam Chomsky has “never seen anything like this,”’ truthdig, 19 April 2010, https://archive.is/o1uXT. See also Ian Sinclair, ‘Polly Toynbee, Jeremy Corbyn and the limits of acceptable politics,’ openDemocracy, 29 June 2015, https://archive.is/Sdlhj.


30. Martin Kettle, ‘Labour leadership: the timing is bad, the process stinks, but this is going to be a good contest,’ Guardian, 15 June 2015, https://archive.is/DmxRp.


34. The Guardian published a piece by Owen Jones on 22 July, pegged to Tony Blair’s intervention, which was a general defence of “the left.” But it did not mention Jeremy Corbyn or the leadership contest. See Owen Jones, ‘Blair attacks the left, yet we are the defenders of New Labour’s legacy,’ Guardian, 22 July 2015, http://archive.is/MPHHM.


38. Ibid.

39. As the organisation Media Lens pointed out in a response to Elliott’s review, simply focusing on the criticism or praise directed at Corbyn ignored the fact that the other candidates in the race were treated very differently: “High-profile Guardian journalists and others have been lined up to direct a flood of ‘disaster’ warnings, dismissals, derision, disbelief and mockery at Corbyn, and only Corbyn. Nothing remotely comparable has been directed at Burnham, Cooper or Kendall. This is a spectacular example of bias.” ‘Whitewash—The Guardian Readers’ Editor Responds On Jeremy Corbyn,’ Media Lens, 6 August 2015, https://archive.is/Jxdwh.

41. As the Labour MP Michael Meacher wrote in a letter to the Guardian published on 12 August: “The YouGov poll in July is surprising, not that 56 per cent (of the 3,000 electorate sample) agreed that ‘we must live within our means, so cutting the deficit is the top priority,’ but rather that 44 per cent did not. This is the dogma that has been pumped out relentlessly by George Osborne, all three main political parties, the City and business establishments, and the right wing 70 per cent of the media for five years. It is extraordinary that such an orchestrated barrage, opposed not even by the Labour Party, should command support from only slightly over half the population.” ‘Labour must challenge pro-austerity dogma,’ Guardian, 12 August 2015, https://archive.is/lxqjk.

Other polling, available at the time, showed that when respondents were not presented with a leading question they returned the opposite result. See chapter 3.


43. In October 2015 it was announced that Wintour was moving from his job as political editor to become the Guardian’s diplomatic editor. The timing was not unconnected to Corbyn’s victory. William Turvill, ‘Seumas Milne leaves Guardian for Labour as political editor Patrick Wintour moves to diplomatic role,’ Press Gazette, 21 October 2015, https://archive.is/ySPcq.
44. ‘The Guardian view on Labour’s choice: Corbyn has shaped the campaign, but Cooper can shape the future,’ Guardian, 13 August 2015, https://archive.is/jW4vg.
   Toby Helm, ‘Labour’s lost voters may never return again, study finds,’ Observer, 18 July 2015, https://archive.is/t0zLU.
46. ‘The Observer view on Jeremy Corbyn’s victory in the Labour leadership,’ Observer, 13 September 2015, https://archive.is/gJM3T.
49. Philip Collins, ‘Corbyn’s not the messiah, he’s a very naughty boy,’ Times, 31 July 2015, https://archive.is/gPwsN.
50. Polly Toynbee, ‘This leadership race is bigger than Labour: if Corbyn wins, Britain could be out of Europe,’ Guardian, 25 August 2015, https://archive.is/zCpAU.

51. Polly Toynbee, ‘Cooper has taken on Corbyn, gloves off. Could this be a knockout blow?’ Guardian, 13 August 2015, https://archive.is/bT9Wd.

52. Polly Toynbee, ‘This leadership race is bigger than Labour: if Corbyn wins, Britain could be out of Europe,’ Guardian, 25 August 2015, https://archive.is/zCpAU.


Jonathan Jones, ‘Labour centrists like me aren’t cynics: we’re the truly ethical wing of the left,’ Guardian, 8 August 2015, https://archive.is/yi3Zi.

Zoe Williams, ‘Jeremy Corbyn has the one Blairesque trait the Blairites don’t get: optimism,’ Guardian, 19 July 2015, https://archive.is/bqP3h.

Playwright David Edger’s unmistakably positive piece was published online as “Jeremy Corbyn’s rise is inspiring, but what if his opponents are correct?” until complaints forced its change to the diametrically opposed “We fear the public won’t back Corbyn, but he can win and here’s the proof.” David Edgar, ‘We fear the public won’t back Corbyn, but he can win and here’s the proof,’ Guardian, 30 August 2015, https://archive.is/y7keS.


Rafael Behr, ‘Here’s a strategy for Labour: imagine that good people also vote Tory,’ Guardian, 21 July 2015, https://archive.is/ZkljQ.

Rafael Behr, ‘Jeremy Corbyn may prevail, but he has no monopoly on virtue,’ Guardian, 2 September 2015, https://archive.is/p8Oxw.

Polly Toynbee, ‘This was the week the Labour leadership contest turned nasty,’ Guardian, 23 July 2015, https://archive.is/BduXm.

Jonathan Freedland’s article was a curious thing. Pondering how to win over Corbyn supporters, he warned: “Sounding like the grownups lecturing the kids won’t do it. Hurling insults won’t help either. Nor will
talk of electability.” This was strange, because Freedland immediately ignored all three bits of advice. He said Tony Blair had “tried to sit the kids down and say: ‘Look, you’ve had your fun.’” He insulted Corbyn supporters as exhibiting “a form of narcissism.” And he talked of electability by saying what was at stake was “the chance to oust the Tories before today’s 20-year-olds turn 40.” Jonathan Freedland, ‘The Corbyn tribe cares about identity, not power,’ Guardian, 24 July 2015, https://archive.is/8PCba.


70. The transmission ended with the words: “If Jeremy Corbyn wins… Her Majesty’s Official Opposition will be singing to a radically new tune.” The accompanying footage showed Corbyn joining in with a rendition of the Italian left wing anthem ‘Bandiera Rossa’ at a rally. If the scene was not sufficiently sinister, subtitles displayed a translation of the menacing lyrics: “Long live socialism and liberty!” ‘Panorama Jeremy Corbyn Labour’s Earthquake,’ LudVan2 72 channel, YouTube, 7 September 2015, https://youtu.be/0O7swacyZnY. Owen Jones, Twitter, 7 September 2015, https://archive.is/aEFUo.
For a critique of the Panorama programme see Tom Mills, ‘Panorama, the Corbyn surge and the political establishment,’ Open Democracy, 9 September 2015, https://archive.is/CYApL.

Chapter 11: Hubris to Humiliation


2. James Schneider, interview with the author.
6. Tony Blair, ‘Even if you hate me, please don’t take Labour over the cliff edge,’ Guardian, 12 August 2015, https://archive.is/VflIL.
8. Alastair Campbell, ‘Nice guy, good MP, making the weather: but it has to be ABC—Anyone But Corbyn. Labour could be finished if he wins,’ AlastairCampbell.org, 10 August 2015, https://archive.is/z4HV0.


17. Party membership increased initially under Tony Blair, but rather than heralding a new democratic age the influx was used to dilute the influence of activists and collective trade union representation, according to academic expert Jessica Garland: “The increase in ordinary members and membership rights created, paradoxically, an increase in central party control: it gave greater individual powers but undermined activist and local party organisation.” Jessica Garland, ‘A Wider Range of Friends: Multi-speed Organising during the 2015 Labour Leadership Contest,’ The Political Quarterly Volume 87, Issue 1, January-March 2016, published online 13 December 2015, https://archive.is/5RsFu.

18. The Blairite dream was to create what the political scientist Peter Mair dubbed a “partyless democracy”: consensus government “for the people,” which purported to be above special interests. This demanded that the party itself be either marginalised or emptied of its democratic content. As far as Blair and his acolytes were concerned, the party was a vehicle to transport them to power, rather than an institution to express the will of a coalition of social forces or—dare it be said—a


In 2010, in comments that were unpublished at the time, Lisa Nandy said: “Over the last 13 years we became top heavy as a party. We were founded as a grassroots movement. It’s the grassroots who are best placed to shape the direction of the party. It’s a cultural thing about respect for members. They are the ones who are best placed to know people’s concerns.” The words took on a certain irony six years later when Nandy resigned from the shadow cabinet in an action expressly designed to overturn the members’ will. Lisa Nandy, interview with the author for Red Pepper magazine, 27 October 2010.

20. Progress resembled a classic party faction, only with a glossy monthly magazine in place of a socialist newspaper. “They’ve got a machine which takes people in reasonable numbers out of student politics and helps them into minor positions, like doing a few hours’ work for a local MP,” explains Jon Lansman. “They then have this network for exercising patronage of people who prove to be good cadre for them, who get promoted up through council selections.”

21. In February 2012, an explosive anonymous dossier on Progress’ finances and activities was distributed throughout the party. It asserted that the organisation was promoting its own policies and campaigns within Labour while having no democratic procedures, and acting as a conduit for corporate influence hidden by a shady governance structure. This coincided with a concerted pushback against Progress by the unions in
what Unite described as a “struggle for Labour’s soul.” In summer 2012 the GMB announced it would be putting a motion to the Labour Party conference to ban Progress. In the end the organisation avoided being proscribed (it would have been extraordinary if it had been, since so many of the shadow cabinet were members) but it was forced to become more transparent and emerged from the confrontation wounded.

The biggest flashpoints between Progress and the unions came over selections, especially those of parliamentary candidates. With the Blairites having lost the Leader’s Office, it fell to Progress make overt interventions into selection contests.


22. When their programme came under attack in 2015, the Blairites’ response was rigid, as if what mattered was ideological purity, not practical results—an echo of the very accusation they spat contemptuously at the left. Even among neoliberals they appeared peculiarly inflexible. With Greece that summer providing a dramatic enactment of neoliberal failure on a historic scale, no less than the International Monetary Fund was beginning to reassess its tenets. But Blairites were more concerned with proving their economic credibility to an insular set of British political journalists. They gamely jumped through every hoop held out for them by George Osborne, a calamitous chancellor whose creed
and career would come crashing down less than a year later. So far from being ahead of the curve, they were being lapped by events.

23. As distinct from the ‘old right’ social democratic tradition embodied by figures like Roy Hattersley and Tom Watson, who also went along for the ride.

24. The Blairites had always been more marginal than they looked. Martin Kettle, a New Labour enthusiast at the Guardian, wrote in 1996—when Blair was shiny and new—that outside the political class it was “very rare” to “actually come across people who say they are really inspired by Blairism.” Labour may have been over 20 points ahead in the opinion polls (a lead Blair largely inherited from John Smith), but this was more a reflection of the deep unpopularity of the Tories than a clamour for Blair’s particular ideological vision. Even in parliament, Kettle wrote, there were “perhaps a dozen” MPs who really believed in the ‘project.’ This number increased once Labour was in government—the power to promote and demote can suddenly arouse fervent belief in a leader’s philosophy. Election victories brought new loyalists to the House of Commons at a time when the Blair machine dominated candidate selections. But while the PLP did become “an overwhelmingly right-wing body,” in the words of Michael Meacher, the pool of support for pure Blairism remained surprisingly shallow, as was made vividly clear in 2015 when only one of the potential Blairite leadership candidates was able to make it on to the ballot.

Jon Lansman, ‘How can Corbyn lead a party when he’s in a small minority where it matters most?’ Left Futures, 20 January 2016, https://archive.is/ZExYx.
This applied to Brownites as well as Blairites.

“It’s the weaknesses you get after a long period of government where you’ve recruited internally rather than recruited people who have built themselves up as politicians,” Akehurst adds.


What Luke Akehurst identified as ideological purity, Liz Kendall described as “purely pragmatic.” The refusal to countenance the notion that Blairism was ideological was a basic tenet of Blairite ideology. Even in their rare moments of self-criticism, Blairites seemed unable to do much more than state the obvious. An exception was Chuka Umunna who did manage to say something original, if only because it was based on a misunderstanding: “One of the huge weaknesses of New Labour was in its reliance on mobilisation from the centre, rather than organising. It therefore allowed itself to be characterised as an elite project with wide popular support but it did not build a base for its support within the party across the country, and it did not develop
leaders from the communities it represented. It was strong on policy but weak on strengthening democratic politics, particularly Labour politics.” The aversion to internal democracy that Umunna identified was, of course, intentional. It was integral to Blairism. Its “reliance on mobilisation from the centre” was not a weakness but the very means by which it had succeeded, on its own terms, for 16 years.


Patrick Wintour, ‘We must all work with Jeremy Corbyn, says Chuka Umunna,’ Guardian, 1 September 2015, https://archive.is/Yd2dg.

33. In truth, Liz Kendall’s result probably understated the strength of the Blairites—slightly. A better-known, more charismatic candidate might have scored more highly. Some Blairites, including Alan Johnson, defected to Yvette Cooper on the basis that she had more chance of winning. But as Cooper’s vote tally was itself poor (17 per cent, the majority of whom were not Blairite switchers), this was of little comfort. It was not even the case that Kendall’s voters were all as devoted to the cause as might be imagined—Team Corbyn’s internal canvassing data suggested that 20 per cent of them put the left candidate as their second preference (according to Jon Lansman). Extraordinary as it seems, there were voters who chose between Kendall and Corbyn on the basis that the party needed to be picked up and given a good shake, whether by the left or the right.

34. The Kendall campaign’s primary pitch was that she was best placed to win a general election. Labour members did not agree. A YouGov poll of leadership election
voters found only 19 per cent believed Kendall could win a general election. 71 per cent believed she could not, meaning she was considered by far the least electable candidate—the opposite opinion to that held by much of the commentariat. Other polls of all voters (not just Labour) painted a similar picture. An Opinium poll found Kendall was the least popular candidate with 11 per cent (Jeremy Corbyn was the most popular on 23 per cent).

‘YouGov/The Times Survey Results,’ YouGov, 10 August 2015, [https://archive.is/XZJCM](https://archive.is/XZJCM).

‘Opinium Research Results / Tables August 2015,’ Opinium, 14 August 2015, [https://archive.is/OYsON](https://archive.is/OYsON).

Chapter 12: The Corbyn Surge

1. This event has been reconstructed based on: author interviews with Michael Calderbank, Jon Lansman, James Schneider and another source who requested anonymity; Carole Cadwalladr, ‘From Blair to Corbyn: the changing face of Islington, Labour’s London heartland,’ Observer, 9 August 2015, [https://archive.is/N2vFO](https://archive.is/N2vFO); Robert Booth, ‘Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour leadership bid gathers pace as supporters flock to rally,’ Guardian, 3 August 2015, [https://archive.is/EbAeG](https://archive.is/EbAeG); for an account that includes the image of the teenagers looking in through the window see Sam Ashton, ‘The birth of a new political movement: mass rallies show huge support for Corbyn,’ Socialist Appeal, 4 August 2015, [https://archive.is/HjzgL](https://archive.is/HjzgL); Jeremy Corbyn’s various speeches at the rally can be
viewed on YouTube—for the speech in the main hall see ‘20150803 195556,’ Leo X X X channel, YouTube, 4 August 2015, https://youtu.be/iXoL_fdmrYc; for the speech in the Council Chamber see ‘Jeremy Corbyn full speech at Camden overflow meeting,’ Ratul Majid channel, YouTube, 4 August 2015, https://youtu.be/pGAQ9zOVGM; for the speech on the fire engine see ‘Jeremy Corbyn speaks from a fire engine in Camden 3 August 2015,’ heiko khoo channel, YouTube, 3 August 2015, https://youtu.be/0M9nEmFcFio.


3. A huge push on social media to get people to sign up caused online mentions of Corbyn to skyrocket. “We had the countdown, 24 hours to go,” remembers Marshajane Thompson. “Best £3 you’ve ever spent, 24 hours to make sure you can vote for Jeremy.”


5. Last of the Summer Wine was the world’s longest-running sitcom about the antics of a trio of old men.

6. Toby Helm, ‘Jeremy Corbyn: “This is the most open democratic election Labour has ever had,”’ Guardian, 1 August 2015, https://archive.is/ajhRc.

7. Llandudno has a population of 20,000, and 500 turned out.
Owen Jones, ‘My honest thoughts on the Corbyn campaign—and overcoming formidable obstacles,’ Medium, 29 August 2015, https://archive.is/tZKIU.
Dan Bloom and Jez Hemming, ‘Jeremy Corbyn rally draws more than 500 people in seaside town of just 20,000,’ Mirror, 11 August 2015, https://archive.is/Kjega.


8. That comprised 300 at a lunchtime meeting in Aberdeen, 500 more in Dundee that evening, 700 in Edinburgh the following day, and 1,200 in Glasgow. Severin Carrell, ‘Scottish Labour campaigners rally behind Jeremy Corbyn,’ Guardian, 14 August 2015, https://archive.is/h5ReB.

9. Not all the meetings were in giant halls. An informal, largely unpublicised gathering in a pub garden in Manchester attracted 400 people. “It did become a thing of we literally didn’t want to do meetings in venues that only had one door in and out,” says a member of Corbyn’s campaign team. “Certain pubs or churches, if they were in the city centre and there was no back entrance, it was going to be difficult to move him out if there’s a crowd of 1,000 people between him and the exit and he’s got to get the train.” For the Scottish leg of the tour see Severin Carrell, ‘Corbyn blames Scotland electoral defeat on weak austerity and Trident stances,’ Guardian, 13 August 2015, https://archive.is/XCGf6.


10. There were 1,000 more waiting inside the Tyne Theatre for Corbyn’s third speech of the evening.
Helen Pidd, ‘Jez we can! Corbyn draws thunderous support on rainy day in Middlesbrough,’ Guardian, 19 August 2015, https://archive.is/gKtF1.

For an account of the Nottingham event, including a great picture of the scene, see Michael White, ‘Jeremy Corbyn steals hearts in Robin Hood country,’ Guardian, 21 August 2015, https://archive.is/PQoU0.

The figure of 2,000 for the attendance in Manchester comes from Cat Smith, interview with the author.


15. Toby Helm, ‘Jeremy Corbyn: “This is the most open democratic election Labour has ever had,”’ https://archive.is/ajhRc.

16. Of course, many of those drawn into the Corbyn movement were not concerned with the fine detail of the candidate’s ideology—what mattered more was simply that it was a break from the dominant Labour tradition. But his thinking informed the character of the movement.
17. After Tony Benn’s narrow defeat in the 1981 deputy leadership contest, Vladimir Derer, the founder of the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy, privately criticised the “presidential” style of his campaign. When Benn responded that the election had been about “policies, not personalities” and that Derer had fallen for right wing propaganda, Derer snapped back: “But Tony, you are falling for your own propaganda.” Jon Lansman, ‘Obituary: Vladimir Derer, leading campaigner for Labour Party democracy,’ Left Futures, 11 June 2014, https://archive.is/sAH97.

18. The money from the auction of the cup went to the charity Age UK. It was tongue in cheek hero worship. ‘Jeremy Corbyn’s paper cup sells for £51,’ Guardian, 27 August 2015, https://archive.is/54Xu8.

19. Marshajane Thompson, interview with the author.


23. A graph illustrating the volume of online mentions that each candidate’s name received during the contest shows four big humps, getting successively larger. The first corresponded to the efforts to get Corbyn on the ballot. The second began with the Welfare Bill, before a
bigger hump signified the surge in mid-August. The final and largest hump, unsurprisingly, surrounded the announcement of the result on 12 September 2015. The volume of mentions for the other candidates was insignificant in comparison.

‘Which candidate is social talking about?’ Brandwatch React, 2015, https://archive.is/OQm5v.


25. ‘Kittens for Corbyn’ later changed its name to ‘Momentum Moggies.’


34. ‘Tackling the Housing Crisis,’ Jeremy Corbyn for Labour Leader, 5 August 2015, https://archive.is/MaqeG.


39. ‘Iraq war—we must make amends,’ Jeremy Corbyn for Labour Leader, 21 August 2015, http://archive.is/WIo3T.


41. ‘Street Harassment,’ Jeremy Corbyn for Labour Leader, 25 August 2015, https://archive.is/y76CR.


43. ‘The Arts,’ Jeremy Corbyn for Labour Leader, 1 September 2015, https://archive.is/RsF9A.

44. ‘Rural Renewal,’ Jeremy Corbyn for Labour Leader, 9 September 2015, https://archive.is/DeqWG.

45. Marshajane Thompson remembers an important moment in the campaign’s online efforts being a post about Corbyn’s mental health policy. “Jeremy was
saying there was a mental health crisis in this country,” she says. “We made a meme out of one of the quotes from [his speech].” Whereas previously the Corbyn For Leader Facebook page had reached half a million people with its most popular posts, that meme was seen by 2 million. “We were like, ‘OK, we’ve literally just jumped from half a million to 2 million people when Jeremy mentioned mental health.’ People wanted politicians to talk about nitty-gritty issues.”

36. ‘Tackling the Housing Crisis,’ Jeremy Corbyn for Labour Leader, 5 August 2015, https://archive.is/MaqeG.


38. ‘A better future for young people,’ Jeremy Corbyn for Labour Leader, 10 August 2015, https://archive.is/yE1fG.

39. The responses suggested the party should prioritise housing, broadband, farming and fishing, as well as stopping closures of local bus services and post offices.


44. Ben Sellers believes the regional organisers structure should have been maintained following the contest, given the inevitable battles ahead, instead of being dismantled. He says: “Because of the shock of suddenly becoming the leader of the Labour Party, Jeremy and all that team just got sucked into what was going on in parliament and took their eye off the ball, certainly for a few weeks in terms of what the legacy was going to be. We lost a few people that were very committed.”

45. A sense of the growth of the operation in the central office is glimpsed by the fact that a space that had previously housed eight staff was by the end of the contest crammed with 25 people perched behind specially bought Ikea desks the width of a laptop. Weekly planning meetings that initially involved half-a-dozen people were soon attracting 20. “There were times when Jeremy ended up stood up because there wasn’t a chair for him and he’d turned up late,” remembers one of the attendees. “Jeremy being Jeremy he wouldn’t let someone else get out of their chair.”

46. USP stands for unique selling point.

47. ‘YouGov/The Times Survey Results,’ YouGov, 10 August 2015, https://archive.is/XZJCM.

48. The same data showed that just 26 per cent of Corbyn’s supporters had a household income of more than £40,000, compared to 29 per cent of Burnham’s, 32 per cent of Cooper’s, and 44 per cent of Kendall’s. Freddie Sayers, “‘You may say that I’m a dreamer’: inside the mindset of Jeremy Corbyn’s supporters,’ YouGov, 27 August 2015, https://archive.is/SsuJv.

49. Yvette Cooper’s ratings with women actually deteriorated thereafter, ultimately slipping to 16 per cent according to a later poll by YouGov that was adjusted to

50. According to the 10 August poll, 11 per cent of men told YouGov they would choose the Blairite candidate compared to just 4 per cent of women. The sub-sample of Kendall supporters was small, but the pattern was similar in YouGov’s other polls during the contest.

51. According to the 10 August poll, in London Corbyn was the choice of 62 per cent of those polled. In the rest of the South he was on 55 per cent, in Scotland 53 per cent, in the North 49 per cent, and in the Midlands and Wales 47 per cent. Burnham’s best showing was in the North, but it was only 28 per cent. Cooper’s support was strongest in the Midlands and Wales. Kendall’s was strongest—or, rather, least weak—in London.

52. According to the 10 August poll, Corbyn had the backing of 56 per cent of 18-24 year olds and 58 per cent of those aged 25-39; but among the older cohort of 40-59 year olds—the New Labour generation—he still won 53 per cent and could even boast 49 per cent of the over 60s.

53. Although with 51 per cent, Corbyn ended up winning an absolute majority even in the age group least inclined to vote for him. ‘YouGov Survey Results,’ YouGov, 15 September 2015, https://archive.is/lQs46.

54. Corbyn’s poll rating rose by 19 points among 18-24 year olds. He achieved an almost as impressive 18-point rise among 40-59 year olds.

For the 15 September poll see ‘YouGov Survey Results,’ YouGov, 15 September 2015, https://archive.is/lQs46.


60. For more on the entryism accusation see chapter 13.


The YouGov opinion polls played a double role in the contest, not only reflecting the level of support for Corbyn but also boosting it by lending credibility to the idea that a left candidate could become leader of the Labour Party. Yet at the same time there was deep mistrust of polling companies following their failures in the general election. Instead of seeing Corbyn in the lead and easing off, many people became even more determined that he should win and either signed up themselves or recruited others to make sure it happened.

62. 112,799 registered supporters signed up in total, of whom 105,598 eventually voted.
Of members who had joined after the 2015 general election, fully 63 per cent favoured Corbyn, according to the poll. He was the clear choice—52 per cent—of members who had joined in the Miliband period. Among those who joined before 2010 Corbyn led Burnham by 39 per cent to 26 per cent. ‘YouGov/The Times Survey Results,’ YouGov, 10 August 2015, https://archive.is/XZJCM.

Chapter 13: The Empire Strikes Back


2. From Cooper’s perspective there were good reasons to carry on. She had a new, aggressive strategy to test out, she had an endorsement from the Guardian, and she was expecting another from Gordon Brown (which eventually came, after one false start, on 24 August, and had no impact at all). It was sexist, she argued, to demand that both women pull out of the race. The Cooper campaign public justification for its continuance was that the alternative vote system used for the election, where votes would be redistributed to an elector’s second, third and fourth preference if their first was eliminated, meant it made no difference whether there was one challenger or three. This reasoning was specious—Team Corbyn’s canvassing returns suggested that up to a quarter of Burnham and Cooper’s voters were likely to put Corbyn as their second preference, according to Jon Lansman. If there were only two candidates, this would cease to matter. Rosa Prince, Comrade Corbyn: A Very Unlikely Coup (Biteback Publishing, 2016), ch. 20, pp. 375-384 (ebook version, EPUB/iPad).

3. An unnamed “source on the Blairite wing of the party” told Rosa Prince: “Andy was only tacking left as a tactical thing to try and defeat Corbyn, and this was understood and accepted as a necessary step.” A “senior member” of Andy Burnham’s campaign team said: “Yvette went on the attack, Liz went on the attack and Andy didn’t; he praised him and praised him and praised him, because we knew that our best chance of
winning was to pick up the soft support for him and try to convert that.” Cooper’s team believed that Burnham’s tactics “validated” Corbyn and helped him win, betraying a myopic view of politics as a game of positioning. Rosa Prince, Comrade Corbyn: A Very Unlikely Coup (Biteback Publishing, 2016), ch. 20, pp. 383-384 and 391 (ebook version, EPUB/iPad).


5. “This was a period when we were eroding the Burnham vote and Cooper was gaining momentum and that was very convenient,” says Jon Lansman. “Keeping Burnham and Cooper at each other’s throats and ensuring that neither of them was the clear leader was pretty critical.”

6. Christopher Hope, ‘Lord Mandelson’s failed ‘mass resignation’ bid to attempt to stop Jeremy Corbyn winning Labour leadership,’ Telegraph, 16 August 2015, https://archive.is/ORf3O.


10. This initially involved staff checking applicants against lists of other parties’ candidates and their supporting nominators in recent elections.
11. Harman was speaking after Labour’s NEC had agreed the details of the scheme, including the £3 fee (the price had not been specified by the Collins Review). Rosa Prince, Comrade Corbyn: A Very Unlikely Coup (Biteback Publishing, 2016), ch. 14, p. 264 (ebook version, EPUB/iPad).

12. A wary NEC “tried to limit that to a certain extent by ensuring it wasn’t just a decision of the Labour Party office” by establishing panels to oversee the vetting process, Martin Mayer says.

13. 48,000 people reportedly became members between the general election and Corbyn getting onto the ballot; 20,000 more were said to have joined by 28 July 2015; and in excess of 20,000 further people became members in the subsequent two weeks to take the total to 292,973. Patrick Wintour, ‘Harriet Harman: we are weeding out bogus Labour leadership voters,’ Guardian, 28 July 2015, https://archive.is/tnYEx. ‘Number of voters in leadership contest revised down to 550,000,’ LabourList, 25 August 2015, https://archive.is/Nt7Zi.


16. The Burnham, Cooper and Kendall campaigns had previously sent a joint letter to Labour HQ alleging that trade unions had given Corbyn early sight of contact details for affiliated supporters, enabling them to be canvassed. “They never gave us any data at all,” says Jon


In fairness to the party, legal worries were one legitimate reason why so much energy was put into identifying potential infiltrators. The concept of using a leadership contest for a recruitment drive was achieving its aim in spectacular fashion, but Labour was left trying to work out who was entitled to vote even after ballot papers had been posted. “From their perspective it was a poorly designed system, but it was the system they had designed,” says James Schneider of the Corbyn campaign. “They had a vested interest in it not completely falling apart.”


21. ‘Number of voters in leadership contest revised down to 550,000,’ LabourList, 25 August 2015, https://archive.is/Nt7Zi.

22. Team Corbyn’s nerves were clear from a tetchy press release put out on 21 August 2015 in response to revived allegations from the Burnham camp that the race was being distorted by “several thousand Tory infiltrators.” It was the only time in the contest that Corbyn’s campaign sounded irritated. “Andy Burnham should concentrate on fighting to win rather than seeking excuses for not winning,” it said.
Rowena Mason and Frances Perraudin, ‘Harriet Harman insists result of Labour leadership election will be final,’ Guardian, 21 August 2015, https://archive.is/YCq4j.

23. While the Corbyn campaign was trying to play down the purge, John Woodcock MP from Liz Kendall’s team (and chair of Progress) was peddling a paranoid conspiracy theory claiming that the whole exercise was a “highly organised” plot in anticipation of a future attack on the right. “The hard left is crying foul about a purge now to prepare the ground for a mass deselection of elected representatives if it wins control,” he said. “The false notion that the party’s process of vetting the electorate for supporters of other parties constitutes a purge is intended to muddy the waters for the genuine purge of longstanding councillors and MPs that is to come.” It seems Woodcock wildly overestimated the left’s strategic clarity. Rowena Mason and Frances Perraudin, ‘Harriet Harman insists result of Labour
leadership election will be final,’ Guardian, 21 August 2015, https://archive.is/YCq4j.

24. Mark Serwotka was probably denied a vote for his past support for other parties, although he was subsequently allowed to join the Labour Party as a full member, suggesting his exclusion had been wrong. Rowena Mason, ‘Labour bans trade union head from voting in leadership election,’ Guardian, 25 August 2015, https://archive.is/IoOIM.

25. Schneider explains: “We’ve got to be able to contact people if there are going to be appeals... Also people are calling up and seem upset and concerned about something and if I were in their position I’d be really upset and pissed off. The fact that someone is at least noting your case and putting it with others and saying that if there is something that can be done—not promising anything—but trying to work it out, has a benefit on its own.”

26. The number changed only minimally thereafter.

27. 1,972 of them were registered supporters, 748 were affiliated supporters, and 418 were full members. ‘Number of voters in leadership contest revised down to 550,000,’ LabourList, 25 August 2015, https://archive.is/Nt7Zi.


32. ‘Number of voters in leadership contest revised down to 550,000,’ LabourList, 25 August 2015, https://archive.is/Nt7Zi.
YouGov’s analysis suggested that just 2 per cent of those who voted in the leadership election had previously voted for a party other than Labour, Conservative, UKIP, Liberal Democrat or Green at the general election—and that 2 per cent would include SNP and Plaid Cymru converts. Peter Kellner, ‘An anatomy of Corbyn's victory,’ YouGov, 15 September 2015, https://archive.is/lZiqw.

33. Those two were the Socialist Workers Party and the Socialist Party (formerly the Militant Tendency). In the 2015 general election 36,368 people voted for the Trade Union Socialist Coalition, the electoral alliance of which they were both a part.

34. “I had lots of conversations with people who said, ‘But I support the aims and values of the Labour Party, I’m a Green Party member,’” remembers James Schneider. “And you say, ‘But one of the aims is winning elections at all levels, including ones stood against the Green Party, so by Labour’s definition you don’t support it.’ ‘Oh, but I support its values.’ ‘Absolutely, but these are the rules they have set out.’”


36. Neil Kinnock appeared on BBC Newsnight on 17 August 2015.
37. ‘1979-1983 polls,’ UK Polling Report, https://archive.is/zLqIl. Labour under Michael Foot supported the government’s Falklands action; the Tory boost was not because Labour was anti-war.

38. Tony Blair, ‘Even if you hate me, please don’t take Labour over the cliff edge,’ Guardian, 12 August 2015, https://archive.is/Vf11L.

39. Dominic Lawson, ‘Patriotism is why Thatcher’s war won her the public’s backing,’ Independent, 2 April 2012, https://archive.is/ldlWY.

40. ‘Mrs. Thatcher called Britain’s most unpopular leader since WW II,’ 18 December 1981, UPI Archives, https://archive.is/Vhitg.


45. Conventional political unwisdom blames the split on the left. The Labour right broke away “because the left wing of the party, people like Tony Benn, had taken over the party, dragged it to the left and made it completely unelectable,” said the Huffington Post’s political reporter Owen Bennett on Sky News in July 2015. “You’ve only got to look at history.” Aside from the fact that the Labour left endured decades of right dominance without splitting, Bennett’s interpretation
would have been considered superficial by Roy Jenkins, the driving force behind the SDP, who wrote in his memoirs that the new party was a reaction to the Wilson-Callaghan government and a move he had been considering since 1974. “While the subsequent and already foreseeable excesses of Bennery both justified and made easier our breakaway action,” he wrote, “they were not the basic cause of the social democratic revolt, which came earlier and went deeper.” A real “look at history” reveals that the post-war consensus had broken down as the economic terrain on which it was built had shifted. Labour’s move to the left, the Tories’ move to the right, and the creation of the SDP were the political consequences.


47. Rowena Mason, ‘Jeremy Corbyn is most popular among voters from all parties, poll suggests,’ Guardian, 15 August 2015, https://archive.is/WBosI.

‘Labour leadership—the latest Survation quantitative video poll,’ Survation, 15 August 2015, https://archive.is/xO133.

48. ‘Corbyn takes the lead among Labour voters,’ Opinium, 14 August 2015, https://archive.is/05MJQ (the full data table is no longer available on the Opinium site).

49. Rowena Mason, ‘Jeremy Corbyn is most popular among voters from all parties, poll suggests,’ Guardian, 15 August 2015, https://archive.is/WBosI.
   For the full video of the interview see ‘Labour Leadership Frontrunner Jeremy Corbyn on Going Underground,’ goingundergroundRT channel, YouTube, https://youtu.be/OUpdXXRvw0.
55. It seemed to work. In early September it was reported that Corbyn’s stance had contributed to the government’s decision to row back on plans to negotiate opt outs from EU social protections. Editorial, ‘The Guardian view on Britain and Europe: the remorseless drift of David Cameron,’ Guardian, 2 September 2015, https://archive.is/wZzhP.
57. These claims were slightly different from the later anti-Semitism allegations levelled against the Labour Party in spring 2016. In those cases, there was an attempt to
brand the Corbyn phenomenon as inherently racist based on the social media posts of a few mainly low-ranking party members, most of which were made prior to Corbyn’s tenure. The smears created during the leadership contest were more ambitious but less plausible as their subject was Corbyn himself. For an analysis of the spring 2016 anti-Semitism allegations written at the height of the media furore see Jamie Stern-Weiner’s investigation, which demonstrates among other findings that the reported cases were not only few in number and largely pre-dated Corbyn’s leadership, but that several of them were deliberate misrepresentations of comments that were not anti-Semitic.


A high-profile case involved the MP Naz Shah, who in 2014 shared an image of Israel transposed onto a map of the US, which was decried as anti-Semitic when uncovered in April 2016. It turned out the satirical image had originally been posted by the American-Jewish scholar Norman Finkelstein, whose entire family on both sides, apart from his parents, was killed in the holocaust. His reflections on the whole Labour debacle (including the intervention of the former London mayor Ken Livingstone) were given in a fascinating and powerful interview in which he argued that “desiccated Labour apparatchiks” were “dragging the Nazi holocaust through the mud for the sake of their petty jostling for power and position.”

Jamie Stern-Weiner and Norman Finkelstein, ‘The American Jewish scholar behind Labour’s ‘antisemitism’
scandal breaks his silence,’ Open Democracy, 3 May 2016, https://archive.is/PYxSF.


Corbyn’s comments came a week after the Jewish Chronicle front page, during which time the allegations were allowed to gain traction. Jon Lansman admits that the campaign could have handled the issue better, saying: “We should have dealt with it through the Jewish Chronicle. The lack of a strategy group was a real problem.” He says part of the delay was due to the practicalities of trying to find the details of meetings that happened up to 15 years earlier. “When you’re possibly going to be leader of the Labour Party the level of interest and the unwillingness to let go of an issue is vastly different [than as a backbench MP]. You can’t just make a comment, you’ve got to actually look into what happened.”

In the delay, Labour MP Ivan Lewis and others piled in against Corbyn. Lewis’ words were misrepresented by the Daily Telegraph, which reported them under the headline: “Labour grandees round on ‘anti-Semite’ Corbyn.” The newspaper was forced to print a correction.


Ben Riley-Smith, ‘Jeremy Corbyn accused of showing “poor judgment” as Labour grandees round on hard Left
leadership frontrunner,’ Telegraph, 14 August 2015, https://archive.is/XVS8J.

One of the accusations against Corbyn involved a Palestinian citizen of Israel named Raead Salah, whose case Corbyn took up when he was detained on a visit to London in order to be deported—wrongly, as it turned out, as he eventually won an appeal. In a complicated legal backstory, Salah had previously been convicted by an Israeli court for using the blood libel against Jews, but was later acquitted, before another court overturned the acquittal. Salah denied he had used the blood libel. Corbyn, when grilled by the press in 2015, said he had been unaware of it.

Asa Winstanley, ‘4 reasons the “anti-Semitism” attacks on Jeremy Corbyn are dishonest,’ Electronic Intifada, 19 August 2015, https://archive.is/QR9Ga.


A further case was that of Dyab Abou Jahjah, a Lebanese-Belgian whom Corbyn had invited to speak in parliament in 2009, who was then banned from the UK. Abou Jahjah was reported to have justified the killing of Western soldiers in Iraq in 2003, although he said he had only reiterated international law—the “right of resistance” that is guaranteed “to all occupied people.” After the initial press furore it emerged that Abou Jahjah was, as the Guardian put it, “a reputable commentator on Arab issues and is a household name in his adopted homeland, with a column in the centre-right De Standaard, and the creator of an organisation fighting racial discrimination.” He was “a firm member of the Belgian establishment” and had even been named by
the Belgian political magazine Knack as “the country’s fourth most influential person, just behind Manchester City footballer Vincent Kompany.”


Rowena Mason and Frances Perraudin, ‘Jeremy Corbyn backtracks over claim he had never met Lebanese activist,’ Guardian, 19 August 2015, https://archive.is/nJb2L.


61. The letter continued: “The approach is familiar. Attack the person not their political views and ignore their record. Fish for scraps of past contact with somebody controversial or in any way questionable, regardless of the political context of the contact, how long ago it was or how brief—then damn by association. Above all, reinforce the message that opponents of Israeli policy must be anti-Semites… The use—and serious abuse—of accusations of anti-Semitism and the like is evidence of panic that someone who stands up for Palestinian rights might end up leading a major British political party.” See the letter from Naomi Wayne for Jews for Justice for Palestinians, ‘Jeremy Corbyn and antisemitism claims,’ Guardian, 20 August 2015, https://archive.is/ggXjf.


63. ‘Jeremy Corbyn MP, Diane Abbott MP, Len McCluskey & many more back UAF Unity statement “No to Nazis in
Golders Green” sign up today!’ Unite Against Fascism, 25 June 2015, https://archive.is/fbPJK.

64. A 2014 YouGov poll showed that Labour voters were strongly pro-Palestinian. This was likely to be accentuated still further among members. William Jordan, ‘British public more pro-Palestinian than French or Americans,’ YouGov, 5 August 2014, https://archive.is/CAnaa.


68. Yvette Cooper tweeted: “Just got off tube. Majority of passengers women. Why should we have to shut ourselves away to stay safe?” Yvette Cooper, Twitter, 26 August 2015, https://archive.is/A3Yy3.

69. The Anne Perkins piece was particularly egregious. Titled, “Ladies! You won’t be leading the Labour Party, so here’s a women-only train carriage,” it called the proposal “an affront to decades of serious work to raise the status of women, and to women’s sense of their self worth.” “The real answer must be to work to make public space safe for everyone,” Perkins declared, apparently unaware that was precisely what Corbyn had said (“My intention would be to make public transport safer for everyone”). Anne Perkins, ‘Ladies! You won’t be leading the Labour party, so here’s a women-only train carriage,’ Guardian, 26 August 2015, https://archive.is/5SQyM.
Kate Lyons, ‘Corbyn’s women-only carriages idea shouldn’t just be dismissed,’ Guardian, 26 August 2015, https://archive.is/63Zm6.

70. Sophie Gadd, ‘Women-only train carriages could be introduced in the UK,’ Mirror, 30 September 2014, https://archive.is/gTRgu.


73. The campaign also drew on the work of Richard Murphy for the detail of how much money was available through clamping down on tax debt, avoidance and evasion. His figure of £120 billion proved to be another magnet for criticism because of a failure in ‘The Economy in 2020’ to make clear that this was the total the government was missing, rather than the
amount that could realistically be clawed back. Murphy subsequently turned against Corbyn, perhaps, suggests a member of the 2015 campaign team, because he was not offered an advisor’s job once Corbyn was leader—“I think he thought he might get a job out of it.”

74. Monetary financing, of which ‘People’s QE’ is one form, has a long heritage. The high priest of Thatcherism, American economist Milton Friedman, coined the term ‘helicopter money’ for a related but distinct idea (printing money and metaphorically dropping it from a helicopter to distribute it to the population). ‘People’s QE’ differs because the money would be used for public investment priorities determined by government (which led to criticism from Professor Simon Wren-Lewis and others).

On the difference between ‘People’s QE’ and helicopter money see Simon Wren-Lewis, ‘People’s QE and Corbyn’s QE,’ mainly macro, 16 August 2015, [https://archive.is/4pWfJ](https://archive.is/4pWfJ).

For further explanation of ‘People’s QE’ see Noah Tucker, ‘Yvette Cooper got it wrong: “printing” more money will help ordinary people,’ Morning Star, 22 February 2016, [https://archive.is/RSMdo](https://archive.is/RSMdo).

75. Chris Leslie mixed up the effects of printing money and borrowing, leading him to make “illogical” assertions. See the letter from John Whitley, ‘Purism v pragmatism: Labour’s dilemma,’ Guardian, 5 August 2015, [https://archive.is/SIFUU](https://archive.is/SIFUU).

76. Andrew Sparrow and Helen Pidd, ‘Yvette Cooper says Labour rival Jeremy Corbyn’s policies not credible or radical,’ Guardian, 5 August 2015, [https://archive.is/ihgs6](https://archive.is/ihgs6).

78. This phenomenon was noted by Matthew Richmond, ‘On Corbyn and our collapsing orthodoxies,’ Open Democracy, 22 October 2015, https://archive.is/l0W8L.

79. Both Skidelsky and Evans-Pritchard pointed out that the European Central Bank was already practicing an element of ‘People’s QE,’ albeit on a small scale, by using quantitative easing to buy debt from the European Investment Bank, which rather undermined the hyperbole of Cooper, Leslie and Straw. Robert Skidelsky, ‘Why we should take Corbynomics seriously,’ Guardian, 19 August 2015, https://archive.is/SDV3K.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, ‘Jeremy Corbyn’s QE for the people is exactly what the world may soon need,’ Telegraph, 16 September 2015, https://archive.is/oDFuv.


80. Another argument, expressed by Professor Simon Wren-Lewis, was that ‘People’s QE’ would impinge the independence of the Bank of England, making it an undesirable policy: “we do not want the government putting the bank under pressure to do QE because the government wants more investment, and if that does not happen we do not want the central bank deciding whether extra investment happens.” For a time Wren-Lewis was on Labour’s Economic Advisory Committee after Jeremy Corbyn’s election as leader. Simon Wren-Lewis, ‘People’s QE and Corbyn’s QE,’ mainly macro, 16 August 2015, https://archive.is/4pWfj.

Chapter 14: Triumph and Tribulations

1. This meeting has been reconstructed based on an interview in which the source requested anonymity.

2. Toby Helm, ‘Jeremy Corbyn: “This is the most open democratic election Labour has ever had,”’ Observer, 2 August 2015, https://archive.is/ajhRc.
4. For the Newsnight interview, see ‘Mandatory re-selection: Do Corbyn supporters want to deselect New Labour MPs?’ I Am Incorrigible channel, YouTube, 3 September 2015, https://youtu.be/C8o4QV970NM.
5. Jane Merrick and Mark Leftly, ‘Jeremy Corbyn: Labour MPs are plotting a coup against the potential leader if he is elected,’ Independent, 19 July 2015, https://archive.is/plQAR.
8. In words that would sound deeply ironic following the coup against Corbyn 10 months later, Hunt declared: “Forget talk of splits. I have no patience with anyone muttering now about breakaways or legal challenges or changing the rules to keep people out. They are playing into the hands of the Tories.”
Patrick Wintour, ‘We must all work with Jeremy Corbyn, says Chuka Umunna,’ Guardian, 1 September 2015, https://archive.is/Yd2dg.


11. The Compliance Unit was responsible for excluding voters who it said did not share the aims and values of the Labour Party.


14. The one crumb of comfort for Corbyn’s opponents was that 50.4 per cent of party members had not voted for the left candidate. This was seized upon by, for example, Roy Hattersley, who argued that “half the Labour party is deeply opposed to [Corbyn’s] policies.” This was wishful thinking. Anecdotally, the result actually understated the support for Corbyn’s programme. As one letter-writer responded to Hattersley: “I didn’t vote for Jeremy because I didn’t think he could manage the complexities and compromises of party leadership and deliver a victory. However, I certainly supported his policies, and every single party member I know who

15. Toby Helm, ‘Jez we did: the day Labour was hit by a political earthquake,’ Observer, 13 September 2015, https://archive.is/mZ76E.

16. To prevent a repeat of the Ed Miliband situation, the Labour Party initially intended not to publish a breakdown of the result by category. Following the Collins Review, with each vote counting equally, it was argued there was no need to know. The panic at the prospect of Corbyn winning on £3 votes soon changed that. Upholding the legitimacy of the leader was no longer a priority—quite the reverse. The results were published in full. The manoeuvre backfired. It made Corbyn’s conclusive win among members visible for all to see.


18. YouGov’s previous 10 August 2015 poll indicated that Jeremy Corbyn would win 24 per cent of Yvette Cooper’s second preferences or 32 per cent of Andy Burnham’s, depending which went forward to the final round. The first YouGov poll from July, when Corbyn’s support was much lower, suggested that with 43 per cent of first preference votes he would go on to win with 53 per cent in the final round. These figures were based on the entire leadership electorate; the second preferences of pre-2010 members might have been less favourable to Corbyn. But it seems likely that Corbyn
would have been elected leader even if only this group had voted.
‘YouGov/The Times Survey Results,’ YouGov, 10 August 2015, https://archive.is/XZJCM.

19. For the result in detail see ‘Labour leadership results in full,’ BBC News, 12 September 2015, https://archive.is/c9ifF.

20. Although Corbyn did best among younger voters, he was popular across the board, winning an absolute majority among every age group including the over-60s (51 per cent). In terms of gender, Cooper won the votes of 16 per cent of women but 18 per cent of men. Kendall picked up just 2 per cent of the female vote compared to 6 per cent of the male. Burnham, despite being accused of running a campaign that veered towards sexism at times, had equal support from both genders. ‘YouGov Survey Results,’ YouGov, 15 September 2015, https://archive.is/lQs46.

21. Toby Helm, ‘Jez we did: the day Labour was hit by a political earthquake,’ Observer, 13 September 2015, https://archive.is/mZ76E.

22. Iain McNicol, Twitter, 13 September 2015, https://archive.is/2gSLs.


26. This may have been nothing personal—staff had reacted in a similar way to Ed Miliband’s election against his brother five years earlier. Tim Bale, Five Year Mission: The Labour Party Under Ed Miliband (Oxford University Press, 2015), ch. 1, p. 26 (ebook version, MOBI/Kindle).


30. Jon Lansman says: “He was told the rules are if you’re going to be in you can’t participate. But who makes these rules?”


32. Although in conversations with potential shadow ministers that Sunday Corbyn stuck to his campaign position that Labour should delay giving a commitment to back a Remain vote in the forthcoming EU referendum so as to exert pressure on David Cameron’s renegotiation, that stance survived just three days. After a meeting with Benn and Eagle on 16 September 2015, Corbyn confirmed that Labour would campaign for Remain. McDonnell later gave an account of the meeting: “Jeremy and I met with Angela Eagle and
Hilary Benn and they said they wanted to run the European campaign and we said fine. But at that point in time we said that we need to agree the politics of this. We said that we can’t just go out there as simple Europhiles because, to be frank, there was a need for reform in Europe. And at that point in time they were trying to argue that we should unanimously support Cameron’s deal in Europe. We refused. So we said, ‘Get on with the campaign and call us in when you need us, we will do all that we can to support.’”

John McDonnell, ‘We’re standing up for democracy in the party—for the members to choose the leader,’ Red Pepper, July 2016, https://archive.is/24ABs.


34. Len McCluskey says: “It wasn’t just the trade union movement [who opposed John McDonnell being shadow chancellor]. It was a whole host of other genuine left comrades. Someone said, ‘Someone’s going to have to tell him.’ And it landed on me. I spoke to Jeremy first. I said ‘I know John’s your mate but this is a mistake.’ We talked about splitting the role so John was dealing with the economic programme but not chancellor. Harold Wilson had done it back in the ’60s. Jeremy being Jeremy, instead of saying ‘Don’t go there,’
he said, ‘Have you spoken to John about this?’ So the following day John came in. I said, ‘Look John, Jeremy’s your best mate, you’re putting him in an awkward position. You really should say, ‘Don’t put me in there.” He said ‘I disagree with you Len,’ and he gave the argument about Balls and Miliband, Brown and Blair, ‘We’re going to do something different. We’re going to present an alternative and it’s important we’re close.’ I said, ‘That’s a strong argument. I’m not going to convince you but I’ve discharged my duty.’ Literally a few weeks later he made a speech at Labour Party conference and I sent word through that I’d like to meet him. We met late that night in a little pub… I said, ‘John, I owe you an apology.’ He said, ‘No you don’t.’ I said, ‘I do, you’ve just delivered one of the finest speeches I’ve ever heard either a chancellor or a shadow chancellor deliver. In my opinion that will go down as a historic speech and I was wrong, so were others. You’re the best man for this job.’”


36. Ibid.


Chapter 15: The Summer Coup

1. The 27 June 2016 meeting of the PLP is reconstructed from the following sources: Diane Abbott, ‘This is not


See also YouGov’s on-the-day poll, which although overstating the overall support for Remain, recorded that 69 per cent of Labour voters backed remaining in the EU. ‘YouGov survey results: On the Day Vote,’ YouGov, 24 June 2016, https://archive.is/xHOGr.

5. John Curtice, ‘Don’t blame Jeremy Corbyn—polls show only Tory voters could have kept us in the EU,’ New Statesman, 30 June 2016, https://archive.is/5SuJK.

6. ‘Media coverage of the EU Referendum (report 5),’ Centre for Research in Communication and Culture, Loughborough University, 27 June 2016, https://archive.is/k82AV.

7. John McDonnell, ‘We’re standing up for democracy in the party—for the members to choose the leader,’ Red Pepper, July 2016, https://archive.is/24ABs.


11. Eagle had good reasons for doubting that she could beat Corbyn. She had voted for the Iraq War in 2003 and against having an inquiry into it. Her own Constituency Labour Party, Wallasey, had expressed its support for Corbyn and was gearing up to pass a vote of no confidence in Eagle herself. And her tearful protestations that she had resigned spontaneously in reaction to Benn’s sacking were undermined when it emerged that the website domain name ‘Angela4Leader.org’ had been registered by a former special advisor to Tony Blair the day before Benn’s demise. See search results for ANGELA4LEADER.ORG, ICANN WHOIS, ICANN, archived 14 August 2016, https://archive.is/kHUWp.


13. Shami Chakrabarti, in her inquiry into anti-Semitism and other forms of racism in the Labour Party, reported that “some subjects of recent suspension and disciplinary process... found out about their suspensions and investigations as a result of media reporting rather than notice from the party itself.” She judged it “unacceptable... that leaks, briefing or other publicity should so often have accompanied a suspension pending investigation.” ‘The Shami Chakrabarti Inquiry,’ The Labour Party, 30 June 2016, https://archive.is/dOIDDg.

14. Marie Le Conte, ‘It Took A Second Leadership Contest For Corbyn To Work Out How To Deal With The
Media,’ BuzzFeed News, 12 August 2016, https://archive.is/YXf4P.


16. Michael Chessum, ‘You can’t call Jeremy Corbyn unpopular and unelectable while fighting to keep him off a ballot because he’s too popular,’ Independent, 12 July 2016, https://archive.is/aUzUV.


21. NEC member Ann Black reported (controversially, as a candidate of the Centre Left Grassroots Alliance): “I would have preferred to [scrap registered supporters] upfront, but as it is in the rulebook there had to be some minimal allowance.” Ann Black, ‘Ann Black’s report of Labour’s 12 July NEC meeting,’ Grassroots Labour, 17 July 2016, https://archive.is/mzDbO.
Many of the 180,000 were denied a vote—it was reported that 40,000 had been rejected by 2 August 2016 due to not being on the electoral register, their payment having bounced, or for prior support for another party. Thousands more were subsequently purged. In the end, 121,517 registered supporters voted.


25. Barbara Speed, ‘Labour may block supporter applications to vote if they’ve called an MP “scum” or “traitor,”’ New Statesman, 15 July 2016, https://archive.is/Sp7yF.

26. The quip was made by Liam McNulty, shared by Red Labour, Twitter, 2 September 2016, https://archive.is/SUxPZ.
Matt Dathan, ‘Labour suspends member from the party after she posted about her love of the FOO FIGHTERS on Facebook,’ Mail Online, 26 August, https://archive.is/DIie7.
27. ‘Croydon Labour meeting bans the use of the word “Blairite,”’ Inside Croydon, 3 August 2016
29. The report, conducted by the Media Reform Coalition in association with Birkbeck, University of London, focused on the first 10 days of the coup. It found that the BBC “gave nearly twice as much unchallenged airtime to sources critical of Corbyn compared to those that supported him.” Moreover, it noted a “strong tendency within BBC main evening news for reporters to use pejorative language when describing Jeremy Corbyn and his supporters.” Less surprisingly, the report found that newspaper coverage of Labour’s crisis was also heavily slanted towards Corbyn’s opponents whether in the right-leaning Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph or the ostensibly left Guardian and Daily Mirror. See Dr Justin Schlosberg, ‘Should he stay or should he go? Television and Online News Coverage of the Labour Party in Crisis,’ Media Reform Coalition in association with Birkbeck, University of London, 28 July 2016, https://archive.is/AC5SZ.

Previous research by the Department of Media and Communications at the London School of Economics, analysing 812 articles from eight newspapers published between 1 September and 1 November 2015, found 60 per cent of them to be critical or antagonistic towards Corbyn compared to less than 10 per cent that were supportive. Disturbingly, around three-quarters misrepresented or ignored Corbyn’s political views—a dereliction of journalistic duty. See Bart Cammaerts, Brooks DeCillia, João Magalhães and César Jimenez


34. This was a problem for which there was an easy fix entirely in the PLP’s hands, especially as many of the resigning shadow cabinet ministers claimed not to have any significant policy differences with Corbyn (of course this was disingenuous).


36. Labour MPs clearly did not understand the consequences of this radical democratisation of the way the party determines who leads it. Their collective
culture remained dominated by what Ralph Miliband, Ed’s dad, called “parliamentarism”—a “dogmatic devotion to the parliamentary system,” the defining feature of which was rule from above. (For further discussion of this point, see Hilary Wainwright, ‘Radicalizing the movement-party relation: from Ralph Miliband to Jeremy Corbyn and beyond,’ in Leo Panitch and Gregory Albo (eds), Rethinking Revolution: Socialist Register 2017 (Merlin Press, 2016), pp. 6-8.) Corbyn’s more than three decades in parliament attested to his belief in the possibility of a parliamentary road to socialism. But he had always been much more interested in power from below, believing that the action in parliament represents the final stage of much bigger processes that have already occurred in society. His repeated invocation of his mandate from the members during the coup was not made solely or even primarily out of political convenience but because he genuinely believed in democracy from below. As he saw it, 172 MPs voting no confidence should not void the decision of hundreds of thousands of fellow Labour members. This perspective appeared beyond the comprehension of some of his colleagues, who resorted to unpersuasive accusations that Corbyn was refusing to go due to narcissism or ego. “It’s not about you, Jeremy,” the MP Ian Murray barked at him at the vicious PLP meeting of 27 June; Corbyn surely would have wholeheartedly agreed.


38. Again there was a historic constitutional basis to their argument. MPs were originally local landowners sent to parliament to represent the other landowners in their area. The first political parties, when they emerged towards the end of the seventeenth century, were loose groupings of these individuals, elected on their own mandate, who only banded together once at Westminster. That basic constitutional framework persists, but a fully-fledged party system has developed within it.

39. After the sense of empowerment many members had experienced during the 2015 leadership contest, national politics had become more remote as the action returned to Westminster. But the membership was still eager to participate, as was shown when Corbyn appealed to members during the debate on whether Britain should carry out airstrikes in Syria in December 2015. By simply emailing members asking for their views, Corbyn reversed the momentum in the PLP towards military action. It was an instructive moment that hinted at the latent power in the membership.


42. The unions’ unexpected success in 2015 had come five years earlier than they dared hope, in circumstances they would not have chosen. Their efforts during the Miliband years to get more union-friendly MPs into parliament were made with an eye to having a leadership candidate ready to stand in 2020. But because of the particular dynamics of the 2015 contest, they had supported a winning candidate from a strand of the party with which they would not traditionally have allied before a sufficient base of parliamentary support had been built.


44. The statement, which was drafted by the ‘big four’—Unite, Unison, the GMB, the CWU—and released in the name of 10 unions, said: “His position cannot and should not be challenged except through the proper democratic procedures provided for in the party’s constitution.” Commentators interpreted the mention of a democratic challenge as evidence of the unions cooling on Corbyn—which may have been true of the GMB. But Corbyn had already stated the same position himself. At the time, with the Labour establishment attempting to force his resignation or keep him off the ballot, merely getting into a leadership election looked like victory.


45. Jeremy Corbyn for PM, Twitter, 26 June 2016, https://archive.is/WiJOE.
46. Conor Pope, Twitter, 9 July 2016, https://archive.is/FcmSO.
47. In the subsequent leadership election, eight affiliated unions nominated Corbyn, up two on the previous year (although one was the FBU, which had nominated him in 2015 as an unaffiliated union; the other was construction union UCATT, which had previously plumped for Andy Burnham). The GMB moved from making no nomination in 2015 to backing Owen Smith after an all-member ballot which, oddly given the tenor of the times, included members who did not pay into the political fund and may have been supporters of other parties.
‘Which unions have backed Corbyn or Smith in the Labour leadership contest?’ LabourList, 11 August 2016, https://archive.is/pdzTh.
48. Within the membership there were obviously opponents of Corbyn. There were also Corbyn voters who could not be considered part of the movement. But equally there were people in the movement who, at least until the coup, were not Labour members.
49. Liam Murphy, ‘Watch: Thousands turn out to support Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn in Liverpool,’ Liverpool Echo, 1 August 2016, https://archive.is/25i35; ‘Turn out of 3,000 for Jeremy Corbyn makes it Hull’s “biggest

50. Evan Bartlett, ‘People are laughing at how small the crowd was for an Owen Smith rally in Liverpool,’ Indy100, 30 July 2016, https://archive.is/O10dC.


52. Momentum Birmingham, Twitter, 24 June 2016, https://archive.is/tv8sH.


54. Jeremy Corbyn for PM, Twitter, 1 July 2016, https://archive.is/ksFTU.


59. Some within the Corbyn camp were taken aback at the hostile coverage. Corbyn and McDonnell even began pressuring Lansman and others for membership of Momentum to be restricted to Labour Party members. The organisation’s rules were formalised, initially leaving it open to those of no party, but not to members of rival parties. Following a fractious dispute, in January 2017 Momentum adopted a new constitution requiring its members to also be members of the Labour Party.


This was also seen in the pattern of the constituency party nominations.

61. The CCTV clips from the train released by Richard Branson and Virgin Trains were carefully selected to appear to show empty seats, many of which were in fact occupied or reserved. Yannis Mendez, the film maker who travelled with Corbyn and made the original video showing the Labour leader sitting on the floor because the train was full, requested his CCTV data from Virgin Trains. When the company finally supplied it, the footage showed the train was packed and corroborated Corbyn’s version of events. ‘EXCLUSIVE: New CCTV footage reveals Jeremy Corbyn told truth about “Traingate,”’ Double Down News channel, YouTube, 23 August 2017, https://youtu.be/47fqjA8CwGE.


64. ‘Undecided voters for Jeremy Corbyn or Owen Smith,’ GarycomUK channel, YouTube, 17 August 2016, https://youtu.be/g2U-slZKeOQ. Corbyn “wasn’t particularly keen to do [the Victoria Derbyshire show], to say the least,” according to his campaign director Sam Tarry. “We knew Victoria Derbyshire herself was very hostile.” Ned Simons, ‘Sam Tarry, Jeremy Corbyn’s Campaign Director, Says “Intellectually Bankrupt” Labour MPs Need Replacing,’ Huffington Post, 25 October 2016, https://archive.is/IchFe.


67. Conor Pope, ‘Saving Labour “signed up 120,000 people” to vote for Owen Smith,’ LabourList, 11 August 2016, https://archive.is/smlK0.


69. Mike Silver, ‘20 policy proposals from Owen Smith—but how many are his own?’ Vox Political, 27 July 2016, https://archive.is/Ub5NX.
Chapter 16: The Snap Election


Chapter 16: Act One

1. The polls probably slightly underestimated Labour’s support. The company that got closest to predicting the election result, Survation, never had Labour below 29 per cent. The British Election Study put Labour on 27 per cent in its April-May wave of surveys.


6. It is frustrating for the reader that so many quotes are unattributed but this is unavoidable due to the ongoing roles played by the sources.


10. John Harris, ‘Stoke-on-Trent is the Brexit heartland that could be Corbyn’s Waterloo,’ Guardian, 13 January 2017, https://archive.is/nessV.


12. This plan appeared to have no prospect of success. Owen Jones, ‘Jeremy Corbyn says he’s staying. That’s not good enough,’ Guardian, 1 March 2017, https://archive.is/SP8pO.

   Abi Wilkinson had already previously expressed her disappointment. Abi Wilkinson, ‘I was rooting for
Corbyn, but he has let me down,’ Total Politics, 2 June 2017, https://archive.is/mLtEg.
Williams had also previously withdrawn support:

15. Jon Stone, ‘Here are all the times Theresa May said there would be no election,’ Independent, 18 April 2017, https://archive.is/F2yTP.
20. The dozen MPs initially regarded as pro-Corbyn were: Dan Carden, Marsha De Cordova, Emma Dent Coad, David Drew, Hugh Gaffney, Karen Lee, Jared O’Mara, Laura Pidcock, Danielle Rowley, Lloyd Russell Moyle, Laura Smith, Chris Williamson.
23. A selection at random—
   Peter Kyle: Joel Adams, ‘Hove's Labour candidate Peter Kyle: A vote for me is not a vote for Corbyn,’ Brighton Argus, 19 May 2017, https://archive.is/q8UxD.
   Joan Ryan: Jessica Elgot, ‘Back me despite Corbyn as May will win, Labour candidate urges voters,’ Guardian, 2 June 2017, https://archive.is/BgNAd.
25. Kate McCann, ‘Labour MPs reject Jeremy Corbyn's manifesto as Theresa May warns the party has “abandoned” working class,’ Telegraph, 12 May 2017, https://archive.is/vr2n2.
30. The list has been seen by the author.
32. ‘Note for Strategy Group,’ internal document seen by the author.
36. James Tapsfield, ‘PM warns she needs an election mandate “as strong” as new French president Emmanuel Macron to succeed in Brexit talk,’ Mail Online, 8 May 2017, https://archive.is/tknGo.


43. Tom Phillips, ‘People On Facebook Didn't Think This Was The “Brexit Election,”’ BuzzFeed News, 8 June 2017, https://archive.is/UQ9US.

45. Alex Nunns, ‘Why Corbyn’s “unpopularity” is exaggerated: Polls show he’s more popular than most other parties’ leaders – and on the up,’ Red Pepper, 10 May 2017, https://archive.is/wHcnw.
50. Kate McCann, ‘Local elections 2017: Jeremy Corbyn branded “cowardly and selfish” for failing to take responsibility for losses,’ Telegraph, 6 May 2017, https://archive.is/jIm7A.

Chapter 16: Act Two

   Rowena Mason, ‘Diane Abbott calls on left to back free movement as workers' right,’ Guardian, 28 March 2017, https://archive.is/YfjhS.
12. For 2015 see chapter 2.
14. Ibid., p. 56.
15. According to the Southside print team.


18. Figure provided by a member of staff for the Labour Party.


23. Tom Phillips, ‘People On Facebook Didn’t Think This Was The “Brexit Election,”’ BuzzFeed News, 8 June 2017, https://archive.is/UQ9US.

Tom Newton Dunn, ‘MAY FOXED CAMPAIGN Theresa May’s support for fox hunting lost Conservatives huge election majority, say campaign chiefs,’ Sun, 12 June 2017, https://archive.is/XyuLH.

24. “Line of the campaign, that,” comments one of Corbyn’s advisors.


30. ‘Electoral registration at the June 2017 UK general election,’ The Electoral Commission, July 2017, https://archive.is/cqfcX.


32. There was also a correlation between the constituencies Corbyn visited and a big boost in vote share, although this does not necessarily mean it was the rallies that caused it. See Alia Middleton, ‘Criss-crossing the country: did Corbyn and May’s constituency visits impact on their GE17 performance?’ London School of Economics British Politics and Policy blog, 9 August 2017, https://archive.is/MaCv7.

33. ‘Top UK General Election Twitter Influencers according to @PoliticsUKTD,’ Listed blog, June 2017, https://archive.is/BnjPI.

34. A BuzzFeed investigation of the new left outlets was informative but amusing for its unshakable assumption that they were “deluding” their audience, as the election result would show. It stands as an unwitting vindication of these outlets’ critique of the underlying prejudices in mainstream journalism. Jim Waterson, ‘The Rise Of The Alt-Left British Media,’ BuzzFeed News, 6 May 2017, https://archive.is/Yek47.


38. According to Bobby, one of the founders of Double Down News, the page had a total reach over the election period of 21 million, 16 million of whom were in the UK. There were around 32 million Facebook users in the UK in 2017.


42. ‘Jeremy Corbyn and Chill | Poet & Vuj Present!’ COPA90 channel, YouTube, 31 May 2017, https://youtu.be/s1BGDqCjE5M.


44. melancholy egg yolk (@ggeordiebore), Twitter, 31 May 2017, https://archive.is/3cxdT.


46. ‘Top UK General Election Twitter Influencers according to @PoliticsUKTD,’ Listed blog, June 2017, https://archive.is/BnjPI.


49. Statistic supplied to the author.


51. Statistics supplied to the author. The Facebook figure is total “reach,” the Twitter figure is “impressions.” Jeremy Corbyn, Facebook, 22 May 2017, https://archive.is/zaNeP.

Jeremy Corbyn, Twitter, 22 May 2017, https://archive.is/JpoBW.

Jeremy Corbyn, Facebook, 9 May 2017, https://archive.is/5MgbA.
57. Charles White, ‘Tories spent £1,200,000 on negative anti-Jeremy Corbyn social media adverts,’ Metro, 10 June 2017, https://archive.is/ZeTRw.
59. Figures provided by Momentum.
61. Figures provided by Momentum.

63. Laura Hughes, ‘Jeremy Corbyn deliberately “lowering the bar” so he can stay on as leader,’ Telegraph, 17 May 2017, https://archive.is/OqYHF.


    Andrew Fisher, Twitter, 3 June 2017, https://archive.is/HdmVO.
    Jim Waterson, Twitter, 7 June 2017, https://archive.is/hVM1Z.


74. Anecdotal accounts were reported to the author.

75. The mention of six lost constituencies includes Copeland, which was lost in a by-election.

76. Document supplied to the author.

77. Dan Hancox, “‘There is no unwinnable seat now” – how Labour revolutionised its doorstep game,’ Guardian, 13 June 2017, https://archive.is/M57zw.


81. Figure provided by Momentum.


Chapter 16: Act Three


4. ‘Electoral registration at the June 2017 UK general election,’ The Electoral Commission, July 2017, https://archive.is/cqfcX.


14. Matt Zarb-Cousin, ‘Labour is surging in the polls – and it’s all because the media is finally giving Jeremy Corbyn impartial coverage,’ Independent, 22 May 2017, https://archive.is/IgFbR.
15. ‘Emily Thornberry nearly drops the “b bomb”... - BBC News,’ BBC News channel, YouTube, 14 May 2017, https://youtu.be/ACg9ajikENA.
18. Angela Phillips, ‘Don’t believe the pundits: it’s too soon to dismiss the power of the red tops,’ Conversation, 15 June 2017, https://archive.is/GevhC.

20. Jonathan Freedland, ‘It’s a delusion to think that the terror attacks are just about foreign policy,’ Guardian, 26 May 2017, https://archive.is/Rt3FY.


22. John Harris, ‘Stoke-on-Trent is the Brexit heartland that could be Corbyn’s Waterloo,’ Guardian, 13 January 2017, https://archive.is/nessV.

23. John Harris, ‘Corbyn shows there’s a new way of doing politics. Straight talking is back,’ Guardian, 3 June 2017, https://archive.is/phHHI.


30. Adam Boulton, Twitter, 29 May 2017, https://archive.is/sQ2FN.
34. Will de Freitas, Twitter, 29 May 2017, https://archive.is/Vs4gB.
37. BBC News (UK), Twitter, 31 May 2017, https://archive.is/w6nfC.
38. ‘Emily Thornberry turns up for an impromptu chat with BBC News,’ Imajsa Claimant channel, YouTube, 31 May 2017, https://youtu.be/jCyrFoYUX8g.
41. ‘BBC Question Time Leaders Special: Theresa May & Jeremy Corbyn Q&As (02Jun17),’ BLIGHTY TV 2 channel, YouTube, 2 June 2017, https://youtu.be/bHDaBvbEn4w.
42. ‘General Election 2017 Poll prepared on behalf of the Mail of Sunday,’ Survation, 3 June 2017, https://archive.is/DkDkk.
44. ‘Theresa May’s personal ratings fall as Labour reduces Conservative lead,’ Ipsos MORI, 2 June 2017, https://archive.is/CZNe1.
To compare with the earlier figures, see ‘Labour vote share rises – but their support is much softer than Conservatives’,’ Ipsos MORI, 18 May 2017, https://archive.is/KiqjS.
48. Nick Lowles, ‘What young people think about this election,’ Hope Not Hate, 3 June 2017, https://archive.is/Mh4Ei.
53. We Are His Media (@ReclaimTheNews), Twitter, 4 June 2017, https://archive.is/N49Qi.
55. Figures supplied to the author. EL4C (@EL4JC), Twitter, 4 June 2017, https://archive.is/sz0UU.
57. The clip had been disinterred by Conservative supporters rather than republished by the BBC. The accompanying text stated that Corbyn had been asked “whether he would be happy to order police or military to shoot-to-kill if there was a Paris-style terror attack.” This was precisely the misrepresentation the BBC Trust had criticised Laura Kuenssberg for. After complaints, the BBC eventually amended the text “to remove any possible ambiguity” on 7 June 2017, having allowed the misleading claim to remain live for four days during a crucial election period when security was the prime issue.
59. EL4C (@EL4JC), Twitter, 5 June 2017, https://archive.is/vP8cL.
60. This was later reflected in data from the British Election Study. Chris Prosser, ‘What was it all about? The 2017
61. Devutopia (@D_Raval), Twitter, 6 June 2017, https://archive.is/IpC06.


63. A YouGov poll released on 7 June 2017 showed there was strong support for the thrust of Theresa May’s response, in particular for the suggestion that there was too much tolerance of extremism. But there was also overwhelming agreement with Jeremy Corbyn’s point that foreign wars had increased the risk of terror attacks, and although the question was not asked directly in the Times-commissioned poll, it is highly likely there was support for recruiting more police. ‘YouGov / The Times Survey Results,’ YouGov, 7 June 2017, https://archive.is/jIglK.


65. ‘Jeremy Corbyn in Gateshead,’ Kevin Bennett Jr channel, YouTube, 5 June 2017, https://youtu.be/34odHCICaVU. Laura Hill, ‘Crowds as big as a Metro Arena gig, witty signs and a sense of humour - what we learned from Jeremy Corbyn’s visit,’ ChronicleLive, 5 June 2017, https://archive.is/kF2ED.


67. This was an idea borrowed from Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the French presidential candidate, who during his 2017 election campaign appeared at several simultaneous rallies—one in person, the others as a live hologram.


72. We Are His Media (@ReclaimTheNews), Twitter, 7 June 2017, https://archive.is/xsg2k.

73. Figures supplied to the author.


75. Faisal Islam, Twitter, 7 June 2017, https://archive.is/f8ysT.

76. Chris Matthew, Twitter, 7 June 2017, https://archive.is/rooVs.

77. ‘Jeremy Corbyn's final rally in Islington,’ Imajsa Claimant channel, YouTube, 8 June 2017, https://youtu.be/qQIUv_X_Usg.

78. Emily Thornberry, Facebook, 7 June 2017, https://archive.is/PeD8O.
79. Anecdotal account reported to the author.
80. Figure provided by Momentum.
82. This number (5.4 million to be specific, although there is a large margin of error when such a figure is extrapolated from a poll result) is larger than the 3.5 million by which Labour’s overall tally rose because an estimated 1.9 million of the party’s 2015 vote did not back the party again in 2017 (this seems like a lot but is historically unremarkable). See ‘2017 TUC Post-election poll,’ Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, June 2017, p. 9, https://archive.is/Ydt13 (download the ‘detailed presentation of key findings’).
86. Dan Hancox, “‘There is no unwinnable seat now’ – how Labour revolutionised its doorstep game,’ Guardian, 13 June 2017, https://archive.is/M57zw.

Chapter 16: Epilogue

1. Labour’s vote share in England rose by over 10 points to 42 per cent. The party did even better in Wales,
storming to 49 per cent, a 12-point rise on 2015. After all the hype about a potential Tory win in Wales, the party finished with just eight seats to Labour’s 28.


4. YouGov had Labour at 24 per cent on 19 April, 16 points short of what was eventually achieved. But Survation, which turned out to be the most accurate pollster, had Labour at 29 per cent on 22 April, 11 short. The British Election Study suggested Labour was on 27 per cent in the second week of the campaign. Ed Fieldhouse and Chris Prosser, ‘The Brexit election? The 2017 General Election in ten charts,’ British Election Study, 1 August 2017, https://archive.is/xXclh.

5. According to the poll a startling 42 per cent of people who voted Labour in 2017 had not done so in 2015, representing 5.4 million people. This number is larger than the 3.5 million by which Labour’s overall tally rose
because 1.9 million of the party’s 2015 vote did not back the party again (this seems like a lot but is historically unremarkable—in 2017 Labour held on to over 80 per cent of its previous vote, a better retention rate than it had managed at the 2015 election). Labour’s success among previous non-voters was marked. The party won 63 per cent of those who had not voted in 2015, the Tories won just 27 per cent. ‘2017 TUC Post-election poll,’ Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, June 2017, p. 9, https://archive.is/Ydt13 (download the ‘detailed presentation of key findings’).

6. Meanwhile, fewer older voters went to the polls, resulting in a much more balanced electorate. Turnout fell by 4 points among over-65s to 75 per cent. These are British Election Study figures, cited in Noel Depsey, ‘Turnout at elections,’ House of Commons Library briefing paper CBP 8060, 26 July 2017, Appendix 2: Estimated turnout by age at General Elections (%), accessed from https://archive.is/E8sdi.


Ipsos MORI had different figures (based on a much smaller sample than YouGov used). According to the company, Labour’s vote soared by 20 points among the

9. Because of the small subsamples of BAME voters, polling companies vary significantly in the vote shares they ascribe. According to Ipsos MORI, Labour won 73 per cent of BAME voters, up 8 points, while the Conservatives won just 19 per cent, down 4. Ipsos MORI estimated that turnout was up 6 or 8 points, depending on the measure used. Lord Ashcroft had Labour on 65 per cent among BAME voters, up 9, and the Conservatives on 21, down 4.


‘How did this result happen? My post-vote survey,’ Lord Ashcroft Polls, 9 June 2017, https://archive.is/YKPpe (download the full data tables, p. 6).

To compare the Lord Ashcroft figures with 2015 see ‘Why did people vote as they did? My post-vote poll,’ Lord Ashcroft Polls, 8 May 2015, https://archive.is/8yYaD (download the full data tables, p. 6).


11. Three pollsters give slightly different estimates of the vote by social grade.


For the 2015 results for comparison see chapter 3, note 23 above.


For the breakdown of the vote by income, instead of social grade, see Richard Seymour, ‘Did the working class turn blue in 2017?’ Patreon, 3 August 2017, https://archive.is/PdiI9.


For another version of the result by employment status, and for the breakdown of social grades by age, see ‘2017 TUC Post-election poll,’ Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, June 2017, p. 6, 8, https://archive.is/Ydt13 (download the ‘detailed presentation of key findings’).


13. In 2015 Labour and the Conservatives had both won about a quarter of switchers.


16. The contention that Labour’s success could be explained by a Remain surge was initially argued in a crass form for transparently ideological reasons by staunch opponents of Corbyn in the media, such as Nick Cohen. Purveyors of this narrative were then gifted ammunition in the form of a widely read article by Ed Fieldhouse and Chris Prosser of the British Election Study. They asserted that June 2017 was “undoubtedly the Brexit Election.” The argument ran as follows: one in three people thought the most important issue facing the country was Brexit; Leave voters moved towards the Conservatives and Remain voters moved towards Labour; those who prioritised controlling immigration were more likely to vote Conservative and those who prioritised single market access were more likely to vote Labour. Therefore, “the Tories were the party of hard Brexit whilst Labour was the party of soft Brexit.” Labour “scooped up the lion’s share” of Remain voters as it “was seen as the best bet for those wanting to keep closer ties with our European neighbours.” But this was a case built on a series of inferences. The correlation between Remain and Labour voters did not, in itself, demonstrate that it was Brexit, and not other factors,
that motivated people to vote for the party. For example, the authors commented that nearly two-thirds of “pro-EU Greens” switched to Labour. There were several reasons besides Brexit why former Green voters might have supported a Corbyn-led Labour Party—many of them had become members of it!

Another of Fieldhouse and Prosser’s findings sat in apparent contradiction to their main thesis. The additional voters Labour attracted in unprecedented numbers during the seven-week election campaign were, the authors found, “less in favour of a soft Brexit than those who already supported Labour at the start of the campaign. In other words, Labour’s election campaign allowed them to reach deeper into the pool of Euro-scepticism than they had in April.” This undermined the notion that Labour’s success was due to a flood of Remainers voting to stop Theresa May’s hard Brexit. Rather, Labour seems to have been adept at winning over the ambivalent.

Had Brexit really been the primary factor dictating the preference of Remain voters, the polls might have been expected to reflect this before the election campaign began. If the referendum alone had precipitated a political realignment, it was surprising that both Labour and the Liberal Democrats had polled so badly for so long. Fieldhouse and Prosser acknowledged this, writing that “it would be clearly wrong to say the election outcome was determined back in June 2016. More than at any British election in recent memory the election campaign mattered.” They also noted (with some exaggeration) that “Brexit was conspicuous by its absence during the 2017 General Election campaign.” If the campaign mattered more than ever, and Brexit
rarely featured, and the voters Labour gained in this period were less pro-EU than its existing supporters, could the party’s success really be explained by it being “seen as the best bet for those wanting to keep closer ties with our European neighbours”?

It is difficult reconcile the chronology of the campaign with the ‘revenge of the Remainers’ narrative. For the first three weeks of the campaign Brexit did, in fact, loom large. Indeed, May said it was the reason she had called the election, insisted that she needed a mandate for her stance, and even accused the EU of interfering in British democracy. During this time the Tories polled consistently in the upper 40s. It was only following the launch of the manifestos, when the conversation moved onto domestic policy and terrorism, that the Conservative Party began to fall in the polls. Meanwhile, on the Labour side, there was a snowball effect as a movement cohered behind the party. That experience, together with the role of Labour’s manifesto and the campaigning contribution of its members, were written out of the story if the result was determined by voters' pre-existing Brexit positions.

Fieldhouse and Prosser themselves wrote that “Labour’s campaign success demonstrates that the 2017 election was not exclusively about Brexit”—an implicit rebuke to the strident framing of their own article. Further, they found that “the main reason that Labour gained so much in the campaign at the expense of the other parties is the strong performance of Jeremy Corbyn”—a leader who was regularly accused by fervent Remainers of being a secret Brexiteer.

Perhaps the desire to make a bold, attention-grabbing claim about “the Brexit election” led Fieldhouse and
Prosser to present their findings in a way that seemed confusing and contradictory. In any case, the detail of their analysis did not provide the vindication that anti-Corbyn, pro-EU commentators believed it did.


On the correlations between Leave and Remain seats and Tory and Labour votes see:


‘The end of the Long 90s,’ Flip Chart Fairy Tales, 16 June 2017, https://archive.is/s3X7M.

17. As one study concluded: “The Conservatives did indeed tend to make gains in areas where there had been a higher Leave vote in the EU referendum, while Labour tended to make gains in areas where there was a higher Remain vote. Significantly, however, the correspondence is more pronounced between the Remain/Leave vote and change in vote share over the longer-term between 2005 and 2017… compared to the change between 2015 and 2017… To the extent that the Brexit vote was associated with voting patterns in the 2017 election, it was more due to its being a symptom of the long-term social and political changes that preceded it—rather than being the focus of an immediate Brexit realignment of English, and British, politics itself.” Will Jennings and Gerry Stoker, ‘Tilting Towards the Cosmopolitan Axis? Political Change in England and the 2017 General Election,’ The Political Quarterly, 25 July 2017, https://archive.is/OIyUY.
The widening of the gap in political allegiance between people who were hostile and people who were relaxed about immigration may have been accelerated by the referendum, but not in an even manner. There were much more dramatic shifts on the hostile side of the divide, where the Conservatives made big gains, probably due to gobbling up UKIP voters, while the impact was relatively muted for Labour. According to psephologist John Curtice, quoting data from the British Social Attitudes survey, among the segment of the population that was most negative about the cultural impact of immigration Labour lost 5 points in 2017, but it made gains with all other segments. The Tories, however, jumped 20 points among those most negative about the impact of immigration. It was a similar story with other measures designed to assess the political consequences of attitudes to immigration: Labour’s gains in vote share did not differ much between people who were willing to do a deal on immigration to secure free trade and those who were not, whereas the Conservatives gained hand over fist among people opposed to such a deal. ‘Professor John Curtice - How has Brexit reshaped British politics? (full lecture),’ University of Birmingham channel, YouTube, 16 October 2017, 28 minutes, https://youtu.be/eTwCZ6oifFQ.


19. The more than 5 million figure is based on polling evidence that 42 per cent of Labour’s 2017 voters (representing around 5.4 million people) had not voted for the party in 2015. See note 5 above.
20. This is according to a TUC-commissioned poll that asked respondents to pick their top three issues. Although some caution is necessary because the subsample size was not large, the gap between the NHS, which was picked by 76 per cent of the voters Labour gained, and Brexit, which was chosen by just 28 per cent, was significant. Among those who considered voting Labour but chose not to, Brexit was a far more prominent issue—suggesting that voters for whom Brexit was very important tended not to move towards Labour because of it, but rather away. ‘2017 TUC Post-election poll,’ Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, June 2017, p. 16, https://archive.is/Ydt13 (download the ‘detailed presentation of key findings’).

Further evidence that the voters Labour gained in 2017 could not be defined by their opposition to Brexit was provided by the British Election Study, in its finding that the party’s campaign converts were “less in favour of a soft Brexit” than its existing supporters. Ed Fieldhouse and Chris Prosser, ‘The Brexit election? The 2017 General Election in ten charts,’ British Election Study, 1 August 2017, https://archive.is/xXclh.

21. Thirty-six per cent of 18-34-year-olds listed Brexit as one of their top three issues compared to 47 per cent of 35-54-year-olds and 63 per cent of 65+s. ‘Post general election 2017 poll for the TUC,’ (an interactive website—select “Important issues” and Subgroups: Age to see the relevant graph), Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, June 2017, https://archive.is/E5fFo.

22. For the change in Conservative and Labour performance between 2015 and 2017 among people who voted Leave and Remain see ‘Professor John Curtice - How has Brexit reshaped British politics? (full lecture),’
Looking at it another way, according to Lord Ashcroft’s polls, the Labour vote was only somewhat more skewed to Remain in 2017 than it had been in 2016. Sixty-four per cent of the party’s 2017 support voted Remain, 31 per cent Leave. At the time of the referendum, the proportions were 63 per cent Remain, 37 per cent Leave. Other parties experienced much bigger shifts, in particular the Conservative Party, whose support was much more Leave dominated in 2017 than it had been a year earlier. Lord Ashcroft, ‘How did this result happen? My post-vote survey,’ Lord Ashcroft Polls, 9 June 2017, https://archive.is/YKPpe.


For Labour’s gains from other parties see the chart ‘A political realignment’ in John Burn-Murdoch, Billy Ehrenberg-Shannon and Aleksandra Wisniewska, ‘Election 2017: how the UK voted in 7 charts,’ Financial Times, 9 June 2017, https://archive.is/5uRCB.

Labour gained far more votes from previous non-voters than from switchers from any single other party. The Conservative rise in vote share, in contrast, came almost entirely from UKIP—gains and losses from other sources cancelled each other out. “Without the switch from UKIP, the Conservative vote would have been more or less the same as it was in 2015,” concluded John Curtice. ‘Professor John Curtice - How has Brexit reshaped British politics? (full lecture),’ University of Birmingham channel, YouTube, 16 October 2017, 25 minutes, https://youtu.be/eTwCZ6oifFQ.

24. According to John Curtice, using British Election Study data, Labour’s share of the vote among ‘social liberals’ grew by 13 points at the 2017 election, while it also increased by 5 and 8 points among ‘social conservatives’ and people in the middle respectively. Curtice contrasted this pattern with that revealed when voters were divided up by whether they were ‘left,’ ‘centrist,’ or ‘right’—categories that he defined mainly by economic attitudes (‘left’ people being more in favour of state intervention and equality, ‘right’ people being the reverse). In 2017, Labour gained 13 points among ‘left’ people, 11 points among ‘centrists,’ and 5 points among ‘right’ people. On this basis, Curtice argued that “the Labour Party did advance relatively strongly amongst left wing voters but actually did almost as well among what might be called Blairite Labour supporters, and this raises some doubt about the idea that the Labour Party’s success is a consequence of Corbyn’s left wing position… The element of Labour’s appeal that is much more clearly related to people’s willingness to switch differentially to the party is actually its distinctive social liberalism.” This contention was one element in Curtice’s broader proposition that Brexit had been “disruptive” to British politics, pushing ‘social liberals’ towards Labour, which partly accounted for its better-than-expected election result.
Several questions might be raised. For one, as Labour’s vote share appeared to rise by the same amount—13 points—among both ‘social liberals’ and ‘left’ voters, it is not clear why its ‘left’ gains should be considered so much less significant—especially as Labour started from a higher base of support among the group. More fundamentally, the sharp distinction Curtice drew between ‘left’ voters and ‘social liberals’ is somewhat artificial at a time when liberal attitudes to social issues form an increasingly prominent part of left wing identity. It is questionable how useful such a dichotomy is when evaluating Corbyn’s appeal in particular.

Curtice implied that while Labour’s success with ‘left’ voters could be credited to Corbyn’s politics, its popularity with ‘social liberals’ was more related to other factors, not least Brexit. But Corbyn’s long-standing social liberalism—in favour of human rights, gay rights, feminism, against racism—is what underpinned his credibility with the broad swathe of progressives that came together to form the Corbyn movement in 2015. Should it therefore be surprising that a Corbyn-led Labour Party did particularly well among ‘social liberals’ when it was led by a social liberal and propelled by a movement of social liberals?

‘Professor John Curtice - How has Brexit reshaped British politics? (full lecture),’ University of Birmingham channel, YouTube, 16 October 2017, 44 minutes, https://youtu.be/eTwCZ6oifFQ.

25. A lower percentage (58 per cent) of voters as a whole said the same, suggesting the support that Labour won came from people disenchanted with the status quo. There were votes in being radical which may not have been available to a leadership that had attempted to be

26. It was either Julia Hartley-Brewer or Susie Boniface.
